Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated Theory”, by Hansen, Thomas Obel
 [1]	  
THOMAS	  OBEL	  HANSEN*	  
Transitional	  Justice:	  Toward	  a	  Differentiated	  
Theory	  I.	   	   Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Transitions	  ...................................................	  3	  	   A.	   Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Liberal	  Transitions	  ..........................	  4	  	   B.	   Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Non-­‐Liberal	  Transitions	  ................	  8	  II.	   	   Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Non-­‐Transitions	  ......................................	  22	  	   A.	   Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Deeply	  Conflicted	  Societies	  .......	  23	  	   B.	   Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Consolidated	  Democracies	  ........	  38	  Conclusion	  .............................................................................................................	  41	  	  The	   presumption	   in	   much	   of	   what	   has	   been	   said	   about	  transitional	   justice	   is	   that	   we	   can	   speak	   in	   general	   terms	   about	  these	   real-­‐world	   practices.	   	   Some	   commentators	   have	   spoken	  explicitly	   of	   one	   common	   theory	   of	   transitional	   justice,1	   while	  many	   others	   have	   implied	   that	   generalizations	   can	   be	   made	  across	   continents	   and	   cultures.	   	   These	   generalizations	   concern	  the	   dilemmas	   of	   dealing	  with	  massive	   human	   rights	   abuses	   and	  
ways	   to	   assess	   and	   evaluate	   the	   practices	   utilized	   when	  confronting	   such	   legacies	   of	   violence	   and	   injustice.	   	   Surely,	  without	   attempting	   to	   make	   comparisons	   across	   borders,	   we	  would	  miss	   the	  opportunity	   to	   learn	   from	  past	   experiences,	   and	  without	   looking	   for	   patterns	   in	   the	   challenges	   faced	   by	  transitional	  justice	  throughout	  the	  world,	  many	  important	  lessons	  would	   remain	   unnoticed.	   	   Nonetheless,	   in	   a	   diverse	   world,	   one	  risk	  of	  constructing	  a	  general	  theory	  is	  that	  it	  can	  lack	  sensitivity	  to	   different	   and	   nuanced	   circumstances.	   	   In	   particular,	   it	   is	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  problematic	   to	   utilize	   a	   common	   normative	   framework	   that	  presupposes	  the	  liberal	  democratic	  nature	  of	  an	  incoming	  regime,	  or	  law’s	  ability	  to	  generally	  further	  such	  values.	  	  While	  some	  case	  studies	  of	  transitional	  justice	  have	  argued	  that	  law	  can	  also	  serve	  to	   restrict	   democratization,2	   and	   while	   objectives	   such	   as	  reconciliation,	   peace,	   and	   victims’	   healing	   are	   now	   increasingly	  examined	   in	   the	   general	   literature,3	   the	   fact	   remains	   that	   the	  scholarship	   is	   dominated	   by	   the	   conception	   that	   transitional	  justice	   is	   about	   applying	   a	   number	   of	   legal	   and	   quasi-­‐legal	  processes	   in	   democratic	   political	   transitions,	   and	   that	   dealing	  with	  the	  past	  will	  help	  consolidate	  liberal	  values.4	  Yet,	  an	   institutionalized	  approach	   to	  dealing	  with	  grave	  rights	  violations	   can	   be	   recognized	   in	   societies	   as	   diverse	   as	   Haiti,	  Canada,	   Uganda,	   Colombia,	   Nicaragua,	   Kenya,	   Iraq,	   Rwanda,	  Australia,	   and	   many	   more.	   	   When	   considering	   how	   we	   should	  approach	  and	  evaluate	  these	  practices,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  keep	   in	  mind	   that	   transitional	   justice,	   if	   understood	  as	   a	   set	  of	  practices	  that	   deal	   systematically	   with	   grave	   human	   rights	   abuses,5	   no	  longer	   exclusively	   concerns	   societies	   in	   transition	   to	   a	   liberal	  democracy.	   	   Rethinking	   the	   way	   we	   approach	   measures	   of	  transitional	  justice,	  therefore,	  seems	  to	  require	  some	  elaborations	  on	   how	   the	   use	   of	   transitional	   justice	   processes	   in	   diverse	  contexts	  affects	  our	  understanding	  of	  whose	  interests	  transitional	  justice	   serves	   and	   what,	   in	   fact,	   these	   interests	   are.	   	   One	   key	  concern	   to	   such	   discussions	   is	   the	   question	   of	   what	   makes	   up	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  processes,	   reparation	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  and	   truth-­‐seeking	  measures.	   	  However,	   the	  field	   of	   transitional	   justice	   increasingly	   examines	   a	   number	   of	   other	   practices,	  including	   legal	   and	   institutional	   reforms	   and	   below-­‐the-­‐state-­‐level	   reconciliation,	  reintegration	  and	  accountability	  efforts.	  	  Most	  commentators	  maintain	  definitions	  of	  transitional	   justice,	  which	  would	  seem	  to	  require	  that	  these	  practices	  are	  employed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  fundamental	  political	  transition.	  	  Some,	  however,	  have	  implied	  that	  we	   can	  also	   speak	  about	   transitional	   justice	  when	   societies	  deal	  with	   civil	  war	   and	  other	  forms	  of	  mass	  atrocities,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  transformation	  at	  the	  political	  level.	  	  
See,	   e.g.,	   Naomi	   Roht-­‐Arriaza,	   The	   New	   Landscape	   of	   Transitional	   Justice,	   in	  TRANSITIONAL	  JUSTICE	  IN	  THE	  TWENTY-­‐FIRST	  CENTURY:	  BEYOND	  TRUTH	  VERSUS	  JUSTICE	  1,	  2	  (Naomi	  Roht-­‐Arriaza	  &	  Javier	  Mariezcurrena	  eds.,	  2006)	  (defining	  transitional	  justice	  as	   the	   “set	   of	   practices,	  mechanisms	   and	   concerns	   that	   arise	   following	   a	   period	   of	  conflict,	   civil	   strife	   or	   repression,	   and	   that	   are	   aimed	   directly	   at	   confronting	   and	  dealing	  with	  past	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  humanitarian	  law”).	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  Rather	  than	  offering	  one	  consistent	  answer	  to	  these	  questions,	  this	   Article	   proposes	   that	   the	   answer	   depends	   on	   a	   number	   of	  important	   factors	   that	   differ	   between	   particular	   cases	   in	   which	  transitional	   justice	   is	   applied.	   	   In	   other	  words,	   if	  we	  understand	  how	   the	  use	  of	   transitional	   justice	   in	   contexts	   radically	  different	  from	   “transitions	   to	   democracy”	   impacts	   our	   view	   of	   whose	  interests	  are	  being	  served,	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  see	  that	  operating	  with	  one	  single	   theory	  of	   transitional	   justice	   is	  problematic.	   	   In	  short,	  relying	   on	   a	   normative	   framework	   formed	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	  which	   is	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   conceptions	   of	   justice	   in	  democratic	  transitions,	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient	  when	  attempting	  to	  understand	   what	   purposes	   contemporary	   processes	   of	  transitional	   justice	   actually	   serve,	   and	   it	   may	   pose	   serious	  challenges	   to	   our	   attempts	   at	   appreciating	   the	   character	   of	   and	  challenges	  to	  these	  practices.	  In	  this	  revision	  of	  theory,	  this	  Article	  makes	  several	  important	  distinctions.	   	   These	   are	   not	   dichotomies,	   but	   reflect	   important	  variations	   and	   differences.	   	   First,	   a	   distinction	   is	   made	   as	   to	  whether	   a	   transition	   has	   taken	   place.	   	   The	   first	   section	   of	   this	  Article	   examines	   transitional	   justice	   in	   cases	   of	   fundamental	  political	   transitions	   while	   the	   following	   section	   examines	  transitional	  justice	  in	  the	  context	  of	  “non-­‐transitions.”	  	  There	  are,	  however,	   some	  significant	  differences	  between	   the	  cases	   in	  each	  of	   these	   two	   categories	   and	   this	   Article	   elaborates	   on	   some	   of	  them.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   there	   are	  important	  similarities	  between	  cases	  in	  these	  different	  categories	  and	   that	   the	   question	   of	   transition	   is	   not	   the	   only	   relevant	  distinction	   that	   can	   be	   made	   when	   analyzing	   the	   cases	   of	  transitional	   justice.6	   	   The	   present	   analysis	   thus	   presents	   one	  important	   way	   in	   which	   to	   “update”	   general	   transitional	   justice	  theory,	  much	  more	   than	   it	  attempts	   to	  provide	  a	   final	  answer	   to	  how	  we	  should	  approach	  diverse	  cases.	  
I	  
TRANSITIONAL	  JUSTICE	  IN	  TRANSITIONS	  Instances	  where	  a	   fundamental	  political	   transition	  takes	  place	  and	   the	   new	   regime	   employs	   transitional	   justice	   to	   deal	   with	  rights	   violations	   committed	   under	   a	   prior	   regime	   represent	   the	  orthodox	   case	   studies	   of	   transitional	   justice	   scholarship.	   	   There	  may	  be	  good	   reasons,	  however,	   to	  distinguish	  between	  different	  scenarios	  within	  this	  category	  of	  cases.	  	  One	  important	  distinction	  that	  can	  be	  made	  is	  to	  divide	  cases	  according	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  transition.	  	  On	  one	  extreme	  of	  the	  continuum	  are	  those	  instances	  	   6 Distinctions	   can,	   for	   example,	   also	   be	   made	   by	   focusing	   primarily	   on	   what	  transitional	   justice	   is	   meant	   to	   address:	   international	   conflict,	   civil	   war,	   state-­‐sponsored	   repression,	   etc.	   	   This	  Article	   touches	  upon	   such	   central	   questions	   in	   the	  discussions	  below.	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   an	   authoritarian	   or	   violent	   regime	   is	   replaced	   by	   a	   new	  regime	  committed	   to	   ideals	  of	   liberal	  democracy	  and	   the	   rule	  of	  law,	   which	   then	   pursues	   justice	   for	   the	   prior	   regime’s	   crimes.	  	  This	   Article	   refers	   to	   this	   model	   type	   of	   transition	   as	   a	   “liberal	  transition.”7	   	   The	   other	   extreme	   is	   characterized	   by	   a	   transition	  where	   a	   prior	   non-­‐democratic	   repressive	   regime	   is	   replaced	   by	  yet	   another	   non-­‐democratic	   and	   repressive	   regime,	   which	  nevertheless	  commences	   judicial	  processes	   in	  order	  to	  deal	  with	  the	   previous	   regime’s	   crimes.	   	   This	   Article	   refers	   to	   this	   model	  type	  of	  transition	  as	  a	  “non-­‐liberal	  transition.”	  
A.	  	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Liberal	  Transitions	  In	   the	   first	   scenario,	   transitional	   justice	   is	   made	   possible	  because	  a	   repressive	   regime,	   responsible	   for	   rights	   violations,	   is	  ousted	   by	   a	   regime	   that	   is	   committed	   to	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	  democratic	   ideals	   and	   wants	   to	   make	   a	   clean	   break	   with	   the	  repressive	   and	   unjust	   past.	   	   Transitional	   justice,	   somewhat	  simplified	   in	   this	  context,	  may	   therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  premised	  on	  the	   very	   nature	   of	   the	   transition;	   the	   liberal	   nature	   of	   the	   new	  regime	  is	  a	  precondition	  for	  transitional	  justice	  to	  occur.	  In	  reality,	  there	  are	  few	  examples	  of	  “ideal	  liberal	  transitions,”	  where	  a	  clearly	  repressive	  and	  non-­‐democratic	  regime	  is	  replaced	  by	  a	  clearly	  democratic	  and	  rule-­‐of-­‐law-­‐oriented	  regime.	  	  Usually	  it	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   degree,	   and	   such	   changes	   seldom	   take	   place	  overnight.	   	  However,	   transitions	   in	  Southern	  Europe	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1970s;	  in	  some	  Latin	  American	  countries	  in	  the	  1980s;	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  following	  communist	  rule;	  the	  South	  African	  transition	   in	   1994;	   and—if	   we	   expand	   the	   understanding	   of	  “previous	  regime”	  to	  occupation	  powers—the	  transitions	  in	  some	  European	   countries	   following	   German	   occupation	   during	  World	  War	  II	  can	  roughly	  be	  placed	  in	  this	  category.	   	  While	  the	  success	  of	   democratic	   consolidation	   varies,	   the	   new	   regime	   in	   these	  transitions	  tended	  to	  offer	  hope	  for	  significantly	  more	  democratic	  and	  rule-­‐of-­‐law-­‐based	  governance.8	  In	   these	   liberal	   transitions,	   it	   is	   a	   reasonable	   expectation	  (although	   not	   necessarily	   true	   in	   individual	   cases)	   that	   the	   new	  leadership	  will	   be	   predisposed	   to	   support	   transitional	   justice	   to	  the	   extent	   that	   such	   processes	   will	   not	   conflict	   with	   other	   top	  priorities	   of	   the	   new	   leadership,	   including,	   but	   not	   limited	   to,	  maintaining	   its	   stability.9	   	   There	   can	  be	   several	   reasons	   for	   this,	  	   7 Some	  commentators	  have	  referred	  to	  these	  as	  “paradigmatic	  transition[s].”	   	  See	  Fionnuala	   Ní	   Aoláin	   &	   Colm	   Campbell,	   The	   Paradox	   of	   Transition	   in	   Conflicted	  
Democracies,	  27	  HUM.	  RTS.	  Q.	  172,	  173	  (2005).	  8 See	   generally	   THE	   POLITICS	   OF	   MEMORY:	   TRANSITIONAL	   JUSTICE	   IN	   DEMOCRATIZING	  SOCIETIES,	  supra	  note	  4.	  9 Post-­‐apartheid	   South	   Africa	   presents	   an	   interesting	   example	   of	   how	   other	  interests	   can	  constrain	   the	   leadership’s	   support	   to	   transitional	   justice.	   	  While	   there	  can	   be	   little	   doubt	   about	   the	   liberal	   nature	   of	   the	   transition,	   or	   about	   differences	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  including	   the	  new	   regime’s	   resentment	   towards	   the	  past	   regime	  and	   its	   crimes,	   the	   new	   leaders’	   sympathy	   for	   victims’	   call	   for	  justice,	   and	   the	   possibility	   that	   some	   leaders	   were	   themselves	  victimized	   under	   the	   prior	   regime.	   	   Preferences	   for	   transitional	  justice	   in	   such	   cases,	   however,	   are	   also	   likely	   to	   reflect	   the	   new	  democratic	   leaders’	   interest	   in	   furthering	   the	   values	   that	   their	  rule	   is	   to	   be	   built	   upon.	   	   To	   the	   extent	   the	   new	   regime	   proves	  favorable	   to	   systematically	   dealing	   with	   the	   past,	   it	   is	   plausible	  that	   one	   important	   reason	   for	   that	   concerns	   the	  perception	   that	  transitional	   justice	   may	   offer	   a	   possibility	   for	   the	   new	  government	  to	  distance	  itself	  from	  the	  repressive	  past.	  	  This	  may	  be	   thought	   of	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   increase	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   newly	  formed	   state	   institutions.	   	   Without	   attempting	   to	   make	   this	  simplistic	   and	   elite-­‐based	   conception	   of	   decision	   making	   more	  nuanced,	  the	  point	  can	  be	  made	  that	  it	  is	  a	  reasonable	  expectation	  that	   the	   new	   leadership	  will	   seek	   to	   enhance	   its	   popularity	   and	  that	  doing	  so	  requires	  that	  attention	  be	  paid	  to	  liberalization	  and	  democratization.	   	   It	   is	   also	   a	   reasonable	   expectation	   that	  deliberations	   on	  whether	   and	   how	   to	   obtain	   justice	   for	   the	   past	  regime’s	  crimes	  will	   tend	  to	  reflect	  these	  more	  general	   interests.	  	  Sometimes,	   as	   was	   the	   case	   in	   Argentina,	   such	   considerations	  seemingly	   increase	   decision	   makers’	   willingness	   to	   embark	   on	  retrospective	   justice.10	   	   In	   other	   cases,	   such	   as	   in	   post-­‐Franco	  Spain,	   such	   considerations	   seemingly	   play	   a	   role	   when	   decision	  makers	  opt	  to	  refrain	  from	  dealing	  with	  the	  past.11	  Clearly,	   there	   are	   many	   important	   differences	   between	   these	  cases	   of	   transitional	   justice,	   which	   occur	   under	   regime	   changes	  that	   offer	   hope	   for	   establishing	   democracy	   and	   for	   significantly	  more	  rule	  of	   law-­‐abiding	  governance.	   	  For	   instance,	  there	  can	  be	  important	  variations	  in	  the	  kinds	  of	  repression	  and	  violence	  that	  took	  place	  under	  the	  prior	  regime;	  there	  are	  important	  variations	  in	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   past	   leadership	   and	   its	   supporters	  	  between	   the	   scope	   of	   abuses	   committed	  by	   the	   apartheid	   regime	   and	   the	  ANC,	   the	  new	  leadership	  had	  mixed	  feelings	  about	  transitional	  justice.	  	  Because	  the	  ANC,	  given	  the	   context,	   saw	   accusations	  made	   by	   the	   Truth	   and	  Reconciliation	   Commission	   of	  gross	  human	  rights	  violations	  committed	  by	  the	  liberation	  movement	  as	  unjustified,	  the	   ANC	   had	   “serious	   reservations”	   about	   the	   final	   report	   and	   therefore	   tried,	   but	  unsuccessfully,	   to	   block	   its	   release	   with	   a	   lawsuit.	   	   See	   Thabo	   M.	   Mbeki,	   Former	  President	  of	  S.	  Afr.,	  Statement	  on	  the	  Report	  of	  the	  TRC	  Joint	  Sitting	  of	  the	  Houses	  Of	  Parliament	   (Feb.	   25,	   1999)	   available	   at	  http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/1999/mbek0225.htm.	  10 See	  generally	  NINO,	  supra	  note	  4.	  11 All	   major	   political	   parties	   in	   Spain,	   unlike	   the	   small	   far-­‐left	   parties,	   were	  opposed	  to	  transitional	  justice	  because	  they	  perceived	  peace,	  national	  reconciliation,	  democratic	  consolidation,	  and	  their	  popularity	  among	  the	  electorate	  to	  require	  that	  a	  decision	   be	   made	   to	   abstain	   from	   dealing	   with	   past	   abuses.	   	   See	   Paloma	   Aguilar,	  
Justice,	   Politics,	   and	   Memory	   in	   the	   Spanish	   Transition,	   in	   THE	   POLITICS	   OF	   MEMORY:	  TRANSITIONAL	  JUSTICE	  IN	  DEMOCRATIZING	  SOCIETIES,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  92,	  99	  (noting	  that	  there	   was	   “overwhelming	   desire	   of	   Spanish	   society	   to	   see	   a	   peaceful	   and	   gradual	  change	  and	  even	  to	  pretend	  that	  it	  had	  forgotten	  the	  past	  rather	  than	  call	  anyone	  to	  account.”).	  
6	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  1	  continue	   to	   have	   influence	   in	   the	   new	   democracy;	   there	   can	   be	  important	   variations	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   new	   leadership,	  including	   its	   commitment	   to	   democratic	   and	   rule	   of	   law	   ideals;	  and,	   ultimately,	   there	   are	   important	   variations	   in	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  a	  “liberal	  transition.”	  However,	  the	  argument	  being	  developed	  here	  does	  not	  require	  a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   such	   differences	   and	   their	   impact	   on	  whether	  and	  how	  transitional	  justice	  is	  pursued	  (which,	  it	  should	  be	   remarked,	   has	   already	   been	   subjected	   to	   intense	   debate).12	  	  The	  argument	   is	   simply	   that	   these	   instances	  of	   liberal	   transition	  have	   provided	   the	   kind	   of	   analytical	   material	   that	   dominant	  transitional	   justice	   discourses	   have	   been	   formed	   around,13	   and	  that	  assumptions	  and	  expectations	  endorsed	  by	  these	  discourses	  appear	   acceptable	   in	   approaching	   such	   cases.	   	   Mainstream	  transitional	   justice	   theory	   thus	   seems	   to	   fit	   relatively	   well	   in	  understanding	   and,	   but	   less	   obviously,14	   in	   evaluating	   processes	  of	  transitional	  justice	  in	  instances	  of	  a	  liberal	  transition.	  There	   is,	  however,	   an	   important	  variant	  of	   transitional	   justice	  in	   liberal	   transitions	   that	   must	   be	   mentioned.	   	   This	   is	   the	   case	  where	  it	  is	  not	  a	  new	  regime	  but	  external	  forces	  that	  call	  for	  and	  ensure	  the	  implementation	  of	  transitional	  justice.	  	  Quite	  different	  concerns	  may	  emerge	  in	  such	  contexts.	  One	  clear	  example	  of	  internationally	  driven	  transitional	  justice	  in	   liberal	   transitions	   can	  be	   found	   in	   the	  Allies’	  dealing	  with	   the	  Germans	   following	  World	  War	   II.	   	   Prosecuting	  Nazi	   leaders	   and	  war	   criminals	   before	   the	   International	   Military	   Tribunal	   and	  subsequently	   under	   Control	   Council	   Law	   No.	   10	   was	   the	  consequence	   of	   a	   compromise	   between	   American,	   British,	  Russian,	  and	  French	  leaders.15	   	   It	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  suppose	  that	   these	  decision	  makers	  had	  a	  shared	  agenda	  or	  one	  that	  was	  internally	   coherent	   and	   consistent	   over	   time.	   	   Nonetheless,	  bringing	   Nazi	   leaders	   to	   trial	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   result	   of	   a	  compromise	   between	   those	   who	   advocated	   for	   retribution	   or	  vengeance,	  where	  summary	  executions	  were	  an	  option,	  and	  those	  who	   emphasized	   other	   concerns,	   such	   as	   diminishing	   future	  	   12 Jon	   Elster,	   for	   one,	   has	   conducted	   an	   interesting	   study	   of	   how	   “modalities	   of	  transition	   may	   constrain	   the	   substantive	   and	   procedural	   decisions	   of	   transitional	  justice.”	  	  See	  ELSTER,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  188.	  13 2	   TRANSITIONAL	   JUSTICE:	   HOW	   EMERGING	   DEMOCRACIES	   RECKON	   WITH	   FORMER	  REGIMES,	   supra	   note	   4;	   see	   also	   TEITEL,	   supra	   note	   1;	   TRANSITIONAL	   JUSTICE	   AND	   THE	  RULE	  OF	  LAW	  IN	  NEW	  DEMOCRACIES,	  supra	  note	  4;	  see	  generally,	  THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  MEMORY,	  
supra	  note	  4.	  14 As	   touched	   upon	   later	   in	   this	   Article,	   creating	   a	   more	   just	   society	   is	   not	  singularly	   a	   question	   of	   liberalization	   and	   democratization,	   and	   evaluating	   these	  cases	   only	   according	   to	   such	   standards	  may	   overlook	   certain	   important	   aspects	   of	  transformation.	  15 Taylor	  Telford,	  FINAL	  REPORT	  TO	  THE	  SECRETARY	  OF	  THE	  ARMY	  ON	  THE	  NUREMBURG	  WAR	  CRIMES	  TRIALS	  UNDER	  CONTROL	  COUNCIL	  LAW	  NO.	  10	  (Washington	  D.C.,	  Government	  Printing	  Office	  1949),	  available	  at	  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt	  /imt10.asp.	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  motivation	   for	   Germany	   to	   launch	   another	   aggressive	   war—for	  example,	  by	  supposing	  that	  the	  use	  of	  criminal	  trials	  would	  mean	  that	   Germans	   would	   come	   to	   realize	   the	   evils	   of	   the	   Nazi	  machinery.16	   	   It	   is	   a	   reasonable	   conclusion	   that	   some	   of	   the	  concerns	  that	  surrounded	  the	  processes	  established	  to	  deal	  with	  Nazi	   crimes	   resemble	   concerns	   connected	   to	   confronting	   abuses	  in	  the	  context	  of	  “third	  wave	  of	  democratization	  countries.”17	  	  The	  idea	   that	   trials	   can	   have	   an	   educational	   effect	   on	   the	   general	  population,	  for	  example,	  reappears	  when	  transitional	   justice	  was	  discussed	   in	   Argentina	   in	   the	   1980s.18	   	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note,	  though,	  that	  the	  Allies’	  bringing	  German	  war	  criminals	  to	  account	  was	   not	   at	   the	   time	   conceptualized	   as	   “transitional	   justice,”	   but	  has	  only	  been	  retrospectively	  seen	  through	  this	  framework.19	  Some	  may	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  simply	  a	  question	  of	  terminology.20	  	  However,	  one	  key	  difference	  between	  criminal	  and	  administrative	  justice	   following	   World	   War	   II	   and	   under	   liberal	   transitions	   in	  more	   recent	   decades	   is	   that	   only	   in	   the	   latter	   instances	   did	  debates	   on	   whether	   and	   why	   to	   establish	   judicial	   processes	   to	  deal	   with	   past	   abuses	   take	   their	   point	   of	   departure	   in	   an	  assessment	  of	  the	  law’s	  ability	  to	  further	  democracy	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  That	  democratization	  can	  be	  the	  result	  of	  doing	  justice	  for	  past	   abuses,	   and	   that	   retrospective	   justice	   should	  only	  be	   called	  for	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   is	   thus	   a	   relatively	   new	  idea.21	  In	  more	  recent	  cases	  of	   foreign	   imposed	   transitions,	  however,	  dealing	   with	   serious	   rights	   violations	   has	   explicitly	   been	  conceptualized	   as	   “transitional	   justice.”22	   	   One	   interesting	  	   16 For	   a	   description	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process,	   see	   ELSTER,	   supra	   note	   5,	   at	  198–207.	  17 The	   expression	   was	   introduced	   by	   Samuel	   Huntington	   to	   cover	   the	  democratization	   processes	   that	   took	   place	   in	   Southern	   Europe,	   Latin	   America,	   and	  elsewhere	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  up	  until	  1990.	  	  See	  SAMUEL	  P.	  HUNTINGTON,	  THE	  THIRD	  WAVE:	  DEMOCRATIZATION	  IN	  THE	  LATE	  TWENTIETH	  CENTURY	  (1991).	  18 See	  generally	  NINO,	  supra	  note	  4.	  19 See	   Paige	   Arthur,	   How	   “Transitions”	   Reshaped	   Human	   Rights:	   A	   Conceptual	  
History	  of	  Transitional	  Justice,	  31	  HUM.	  RTS.	  Q.	  321,	  327–28	  (2009).	  20 See,	  e.g.,	  Ruti	  G.	  Teitel,	  Transitional	  Justice	  Genealogy,	  16	  HARV.	  HUM.	  RTS.	  J.	  69,	  72	  (2003)	   (considering	   post-­‐war	   justice	   in	   Germany	   and	   other	   European	   countries	   a	  “first	  phase	  of	  .	  .	  .	  transitional	  justice”).	  21 It	   is	   an	   idea	   that	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   the	   discussions	   of	   how	   to	   respond	   to	   the	  repression	   under	   military	   rule	   in	   Argentina.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   Jaime	   Malamud-­‐Goti,	  
Transitional	  Governments	  in	  the	  Breach:	  Why	  Punish	  State	  Criminals?,	  12	  HUM.	  RTS.	  Q.	  1	  (1990)	  (rejecting	  conventional	  penal	  theory,	  but	  arguing	  that	  punishment	  of	  state	  criminals	  can	  be	  justified	  since	  it	  may	  strengthen	  democratic	  values).	  	  See	  also	  NINO,	  
supra	   note	   4	   (arguing	   that	   the	   key	   justification	   for	   transitional	   justice	   in	  Argentina	  should	  be	  found	  in	  the	  law’s	  ability	  to	  consolidate	  democratic	  values	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  itself).	  22 Besides	  the	  Iraqi	  case	  discussed	  below,	  attempts	  to	  deal	  with	  past	  abuses	  in	  the	  foreign	  imposed	  transition	  in	  Afghanistan	  has	  also	  been	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  transitional	   justice.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   Patricia	   Gossman,	   Truth,	   Justice	   and	   Stability	   in	  
Afghanistan,	   in	   TRANSITIONAL	   JUSTICE	   IN	   THE	   TWENTY-­‐FIRST	   CENTURY:	   BEYOND	   TRUTH	  VERSUS	  JUSTICE,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  255.	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  can	  be	  found	  in	  U.S.-­‐occupied	  Iraq.	   	  Prosecuting	   leaders	  of	   Saddam	  Hussein’s	   regime,	   including	   Saddam	  Hussein	   himself,	  and	   screening	   the	   new	   administration	   for	   high-­‐ranking	   Ba’ath	  party	   members	   following	   that	   regime’s	   ousting	   may,	   on	   the	  surface,	   appear	   similar	   to	   transitional	   justice	   in	   domestically	  driven	  liberal	  transitions.	  	  However,	  as	  some	  commentators	  have	  pointed	   out,	   key	   differences	   not	   only	   concern	   the	   question	   of	  ownership,	   but	   also	   the	   interests	   that	   are	   served	  by	   transitional	  justice,	   and	   even	   by	   describing	   what	   is	   happening	   in	   Iraq	   as	   a	  matter	  of	  transitional	  justice.23	  One	   important	   observation	   is	   that	   such	   conceptualization	   fits	  well	  into	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  disseminating	  the	  picture	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  case	  is	  a	  liberal	  transition—that	  it	  is	  a	  project	  of	  democratization	  where	   an	   atrocious	   and	   non-­‐democratic	   leader	   was	   ousted	   by	  foreign	  forces	  whose	  intentions	  were	  to	  help	  the	  Iraqis	  establish	  a	  better,	  more	   just,	  and	  democratic	  society.	   	  One	   further	  challenge	  of	  approaching	  the	  Iraqi	  case	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  transitional	  justice	  in	  a	   liberal	   transition	   is	   that	   abuses	   under	   Saddam	   Hussein’s	  regime—and	   not	   abuses	   committed	   by	   occupation	   forces—are	  the	  ones	  dealt	  with	  by	  these	  processes.	   	   In	   fact,	  one	  might	  argue	  that	   the	   transitional	   justice	   framework	   provides	   the	   occupation	  forces	  with	  a	  helpful	  tool	  in	  differentiating	  crimes	  under	  the	  past	  regime	  from	  their	  own	  crimes.24	  In	   sum,	   transitional	   justice	   theory	   has	   predominantly	   been	  informed	  by	  cases	  of	   liberal	   transition.	   	  The	  assumption	  of	   law’s	  connection	  to	  liberalization	  and	  democratization,	  as	  endorsed	  by	  influential	   studies,	   appears	   to	   provide	   useful	   tools	   for	   debating	  transitional	  justice	  in	  these	  cases.	  	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	   that	   reaching	   these	   objectives	   may	   in	   some	   cases	   require	  that	   the	   new	   regime	   refrains	   from	   retrospective	   justice,	   and	  we	  must	  accept	  that	  transitional	  justice	  in	  these	  cases	  can	  also	  serve	  other	  objectives	  than	  liberalization	  and	  democratization.	  	  It	  is	  also	  necessary	   to	   recognize	   that	   there	   can	   be	   important	   differences	  between	   transitional	   justice	   when	   used	   in	   a	   transition	   brought	  about	   by	   domestic	   forces	   and	   transitional	   justice	   brought	   about	  by	  external	  forces.	  
B.	  	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Non-­‐Liberal	  Transitions	  In	   the	   second	   scenario,	   transitional	   justice	   also	   relates	   to	   the	  new	  regime	  disapproving	   the	  prior.	   	   Such	  disapproval,	   however,	  does	  not	  correlate	  with	  the	  new	  regime	  supporting	  liberalization	  and	   democratization.	   	   The	   new	   regime	   may	   be	   non-­‐democratic	  	   23 CHRISTINE	   BELL	   ET	   AL.,	   The	   Battle	   for	   Transitional	   Justice:	   Hegemony,	   Iraq,	   and	  
International	  Law,	   in	   JUDGES,	  TRANSITION,	  AND	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  147	  (John	  Morison	  et	  al.	  eds.,	  2007).	  24 Id.	   	  See	   also	  Eric	  Stover	  et	   al.,	  Bremer’s	   ‘Gordian	  Knot’:	  Transitional	   Justice	  and	  
the	   U.S.	   Occupation	   of	   Iraq,	   in	   TRANSITIONAL	   JUSTICE	   IN	   THE	   TWENTY-­‐FIRST	   CENTURY:	  BEYOND	  TRUTH	  VERSUS	  JUSTICE,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  229.	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  and/or	   restrict	   or	   systematically	   violate	   citizens’	   fundamental	  rights	   as	   a	  means	  of	   consolidating	   its	   rule,	  maintaining	   security,	  or	   for	   other	   reasons.	   	   As	   is	   the	   case	   in	   liberal	   transitions,	  transitional	  justice	  in	  these	  instances	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  premised	  on	  the	   existence	   of	   a	   fundamental	   political	   transition.	   	   The	  fundamental	   political	   transition,	   with	   the	   new	   regime	  disapproving	   the	  prior,	   is	   a	  precondition	   for	  making	   transitional	  justice	   possible,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   domestic	   sphere.	   	   The	   main	  difference	   to	   the	   above,	   therefore,	   is	   that	   the	   new	   regime	   is	   not	  committed	   (or	   significantly	   less	   committed)	   to	   democratic	  principles	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	   	  We	  can	  thus	  speak	  of	  transitional	  justice	  in	  “non-­‐liberal	  transitions.”	  Again,	  in	  reality,	  there	  may	  be	  few	  examples	  of	  an	  illiberal	  and	  repressive	   regime	   being	   replaced	   by	   a	   regime	   that	   is	   equally	  illiberal	   and	   repressive,	   with	   the	   later,	   however,	   fundamentally	  contesting	   the	   legitimacy	   and	   righteousness	   of	   the	   prior,	   and	  therefore	   embarking	   on	   transitional	   justice	   to	   deal	   with	   its	  crimes.	   	   Nonetheless,	   there	   are	   many	   examples	   of	   transitional	  justice	  being	  brought	  into	  play	  by	  a	  new	  regime	  that	  may	  be	   less	  atrocious	  or	  notoriously	  repressive	  than	  its	  predecessor,	  but	  still	  cannot	  reasonably	  be	  looked	  at	  as	  liberal	  democratic.	  The	  Rwandan	   case,	  which	  has	  been	  debated	  quite	   extensively	  in	   the	   scholarship,	   provides	   a	   clear	   example	   of	   how	   transitional	  justice	  can	  be	  used	  by	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  regime.	   	  Some	  scholars	  have	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  compare	  the	  current	  regime	  with	  the	  preceding,	  which	   was	   responsible	   for	   the	   1994	   Genocide.	   	   Filip	   Reyntjens	  argues,	  	   There	   is	   a	   striking	   continuity	   from	   the	   pre-­‐genocide	   to	   the	  post-­‐genocide	  regime	  in	  Rwanda.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  power	  is	  exercised	  by	  the	  RPF	  [Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front]	  echoes	  that	  of	  the	  days	  of	  single-­‐party	  rule	  in	  several	  respects.	  	  A	  small	  inner	  circle	  of	  RPF	  leaders	  takes	  the	  important	  decisions,	  while	  the	  Cabinet	   is	   left	  with	   the	  daily	   routine	  of	  managing	   the	  state	  apparatus.	  	  Under	  both	  Habyarimana	  and	  Kagame,	  a	  clientelistic	  network	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   akazu	   accumulates	   wealth	   and	  privileges.	   	   Both	   have	   manipulated	   ethnicity,	   the	   former	   by	  scapegoating	  and	  eventually	  exterminating	   the	  Tutsi,	   the	   latter	  by	   discriminating	   against	   the	   Hutu	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   ethnic	  amnesia.	  	  Both	  have	  used	  large-­‐scale	  violence	  to	  eliminate	  their	  opponents,	  and	  they	  have	  done	  so	  with	  total	  impunity,	  which	  is	  another	  element	  of	  continuity.25	  While	   some	   of	   these	   observations	   are	   not	   entirely	   unmerited,	  they	   fail	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   difference	   in	   scope	   and	   gravity	   of	  abuses.	   	  More	   importantly	   for	   this	   discussion,	   Reyntjens	   fails	   to	  discuss	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  restricting	  and	  violating	  rights	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  eventually	  lead	  to	  genocide,	  
	   25 Filip	  Reyntjens,	  Rwanda,	  Ten	  Years	  on:	  From	  Genocide	  to	  Dictatorship,	  103	  AFR.	  AFF.	  177,	  208	  (2004).	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  and	   restricting	   and	   violating	   certain	   rights	   following	   a	   genocide	  carried	  out	  by	  ordinary	  peasants	  and	  city	  dwellers.26	  That	  being	  said,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	  transitional	  justice	  in	  Rwanda	   unfolds	   under	   the	   guidance	   of	   a	   liberal	   regime.	   	   The	  regime’s	   non-­‐liberal	   nature	   is	   evident	   from	   a	   number	   of	  circumstances.	   	   The	   holding	   of	   elections,	   for	   example,	   was	  postponed	   for	   several	   years	   because	   the	   RPF	   insisted	   that	   the	  population	  was	   not	   yet	  mature	   enough	   to	   elect	   its	   leaders.27	   	   In	  2003,	  when	  the	  RPF	  finally	  obtained	  a	  democratic	  mandate	  it	  was	  in	   elections	   generally	   observed	   to	   have	   significant	   flaws,	   most	  notably	   because	   the	   main	   opposition	   party	   (MDR)	   had	   been	  dissolved	  by	   the	  RPF-­‐dominated	  Transitional	  National	  Assembly	  prior	   to	   the	   elections,	   and	   because	   the	   RPF	   had	   provided	   itself	  with	   important	   advantages	   in	   the	   campaigning,	   while	   still	  intimidating	   the	   little	   opposition	   that	   was	   left.28	   Moreover,	   the	  RPF	   administration	   continues	   to	   violate	   or	   restrict	   a	   number	   of	  fundamental	  human	  rights	  and	  provides	  little	  room	  for	  maneuver	  for	   the	  political	  opposition—in	  particular	  by	  bringing	  charges	  of	  divisionism	  and	  genocide	  ideology	  against	  any	  critical	  voices.29	  	  It	  does	   not	   seem	   entirely	   unfair	   to	   conclude	   that	   key	  members	   of	  the	   RPF	   leadership	   have	   considered,	   and	   continue	   to	   consider,	  that	  Rwandans	  are	  not	  ready	  for	  a	  pluralistic	  democracy	  and	  that	  quite	  extensive	  restrictions	  on	  Rwandans’	  freedoms,	  including	  the	  
	   26 See,	  e.g.,	  GERARD	  PRUNIER,	  THE	  RWANDA	  CRISIS:	  HISTORY	  OF	  A	  GENOCIDE	  247	  (1995).	  27 See	  sources	  cited	  infra	  note	  48.	  	  28 The	  elections	  were	  originally	  envisaged	  to	  take	  place	   in	  2000.	  Other	  criticisms	  of	   the	  elections	   include:	   (1)	   that	   the	  campaigning	  period	  was	  restricted	   to	  20	  days;	  (2)	  that	  the	  media	  significantly	   favoured	  the	  RPF;	  (3)	  that	  the	  RPF	  used	  state	   funds	  for	  its	  campaigning;	  (4)	  that	  the	  National	  Electoral	  Commission	  was	  biased	  towards	  the	   RPF,	   for	   example	   because	   it	   focused	   almost	   exclusively	   on	   monitoring	   and	  summoning	  opposition	  candidates;	  and	  (5)	  that	  state	  agencies	  harassed	  the	  political	  opposition,	  including	  arrests	  that	  allegedly	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  the	  opposition	  from	  campaigning	   or	   voting.	   	   For	   some	   detailed	   accounts	   of	   the	   elections,	   see,	   e.g.,	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  Rwanda	  at	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Transition:	  A	  Necessary	  Political	  
Liberalisation	   (Nov.	   13,	   2002),	  http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-­‐africa/rwanda/053-­‐rwanda-­‐at-­‐the-­‐end	   -­‐of-­‐the-­‐transition-­‐a-­‐necessary-­‐political-­‐liberalisation.aspx;	   Ingrid	   Samsft	  &	  Orrvar	  Dalby,	  THE	  NORWEGIAN	   INST.	  OF	  HUM.	  RTS./NORDEM,	  RWANDA:	  PRESIDENTIAL	  AND	   PARLIAMENTARY	   ELECTIONS	   2003	   (2003),	   http://www.cmi.no/	  publications/file/1770-­‐rwanda-­‐presidential-­‐and-­‐parliamentary-­‐elections.pdf.	   	   See	  
also	  Jens	  Meierhenrich,	  Presidential	  and	  Parliamentary	  Elections	  in	  Rwanda,	  2003,	  25	  ELECTORAL	   STUD.	   627	   (2006).	   	   Many	   of	   the	   same	   criticisms	   were	   raised	   after	   the	  September	   2008	   parliamentary	   elections,	   and	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   there	   is	  virtually	  no	  political	  opposition	  in	  Rwanda	  today.	  	  Both	  of	  the	  opposition	  parties	  have	  not	  joined	  the	  RPF-­‐coalition,	  the	  PSD	  and	  the	  PL,	  support	  Paul	  Kagame’s	  presidency.	  
See,	   e.g.,	   EUR.	   UNION	   ELECTION	   OBSERVATION	   MISSION,	   REPUBLIC	   OF	   RWANDA:	   FINAL	  REPORT,	   LEGISLATIVE	   ELECTIONS	   TO	   THE	   CHAMBER	   OF	   DEPUTIES	   15–18	   SEPTEMBER	   2008,	  http://www.delrwa.ec.europa.eu/en/downloads/studies_assessments/EUEOM_Rwanda_Final_Report_EN	  .pdf.	  29 See,	   e.g.,	   Lars	   Waldorf,	   Revisiting	   Hotel	   Rwanda:	   Genocide	   Ideology,	  
Reconciliation,	  and	  Rescuers,	  11	  J.	  GENOCIDE	  RES.	  101	  (2009).	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  freedom	   to	   criticize	   those	   in	   power,	   are	   necessary	   to	   maintain	  order	  and	  achieve	  progressive	  change.30	  Rwanda,	   despite	   a	   number	   of	   unique	   features,	   is	   not	   the	   only	  case	  where	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  regime	  launches	  a	  process	  of	  transitional	  justice	  to	  deal	  with	  crimes	  committed	  under	  a	  previous	  regime.	  In	  Nicaragua,	  the	  Sandinistas’	  military	  victory	  over	  the	  Somoza	  dictatorship	   in	   1979,	   known	   as	   the	  Revolution,	  was	   followed	  by	  trials	   of	   captured	   Somoza	   supporters,	   in	   which	   more	   than	   five	  thousand	   cases	   were	   adjudicated	   by	   “popular	   tribunals”	   with	  politically	   appointed	   judges	   who	   usually	   had	   no	   documented	  qualifications	   in	   law.31	   	   The	   left-­‐ish	   junta	   governing	   the	   country	  from	  1979	   appears	   to	   have	   been	  more	   sensitive	   to	   the	   needs	   of	  Nicaraguans	   than	   the	   preceding	   right-­‐wing	   dictatorship,	   and,	   in	  some	  important	  aspects,	  improved	  human	  rights	  protection.	  	  Yet,	  we	  can	  hardly	  describe	  the	  revolution	  as	  a	  liberal	  regime	  change.	  	  The	   Sandinistas’	   rule,	   although	   seemingly	   popular	   with	   large	  segments	  of	  the	  population,	  did	  not	  rest	  on	  a	  democratic	  mandate	  until	   1984.32	   	   Moreover,	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   was	   declared	   in	  1982	  (due	  to	  the	  U.S.-­‐sponsored	  Contras’	  insurgencies)	  and	  lasted	  until	   1988,	   under	   which	   human	   rights	   such	   as	   the	   right	   to	  assembly,	   freedom	   of	   speech,	   and	   habeas	   corpus	   were	   severely	  restricted.33	   	   Perhaps	   because	   the	   Nicaraguan	   case	   so	   obviously	  deviates	  from	  the	  question	  of	  “how	  emerging	  democracies	  reckon	  with	  former	  regimes,”34	  transitional	  justice	  in	  Nicaragua	  has	  only	  rarely	  been	  analyzed	  in	  the	  scholarship.	  Another	   rarely	   mentioned	   case	   of	   transitional	   justice	   under	  non-­‐liberal	  rule	  occurred	  in	  Uzbekistan.	  	  In	  1999,	  Uzbek	  President	  Islam	   Karimov	   launched	   a	   truth	   commission	   in	   his	   country.	  	  Despite	   Karimov’s	   prior	   connection	   to	   the	   Uzbek	   communist	  party,	   “The	   Commission	   for	   the	   Promotion	   of	   the	   Memory	   of	  Victims”	  was	  mandated	  to	  look	  into	  repression	  under	  Soviet	  rule,	  an	   era	   now	   seemingly	   blamed	   for	   the	   misfortunes	   of	   today’s	  	   30 This	  observation	  is	  supported	  by	  most	  of	  those	  who	  have	  analyzed	  the	  current	  leadership.	   	   Stephen	   Kinzer,	   in	   his	   generally	   pro-­‐RPF	   account	   of	   post-­‐genocide	  Rwanda,	   which	   is	   based	   on	   extensive	   interviews	   with	   Rwandan	   President	   Paul	  Kagame,	  notes:	  “Authoritarian	  regimes	  often	  sow	  the	  seeds	  of	  their	  own	  destruction,	  but	   President	  Kagame	   and	  many	   others	   believe	   that	   in	   postgenocide	  Rwanda,	   only	  such	   a	   government	   can	   prevent	   another	   cataclysm.”	   	   STEPHEN	   KINZER,	   A	   THOUSAND	  HILLS:	  RWANDA’S	  REBIRTH	  AND	  THE	  MAN	  WHO	  DREAMED	  IT	  242	  (2008).	  31 See,	  e.g.,	  James	  H.	  McDonald	  &	  Marjorie	  S.	  Zatz,	  Popular	  Justice	  in	  Revolutionary	  
Nicaragua,	  1	  SOC.	  &	  LEGAL	  STUD.	  283	  (1992).	  32 See,	  e.g.,	  W.	  Gordon	  West,	  The	  Sandinista	  Record	  on	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Nicaragua,	  22	  DROIT	  ET	  SOCIÉTÉ	  393	  (1992).	  33 Id.;	   see	  also	  McDonald	  &	  Zatz,	  supra	  note	  31.	   	  The	  restrictions	  on	   fundamental	  rights	   under	   Sandinista	   rule,	   however,	   must	   be	   viewed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   U.S.-­‐sponsored	  Contra	  insurgencies.	  	  This	  article	  later	  returns	  to	  the	  important	  argument	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  “liberal”	  and	  “non-­‐liberal”	  transitions	  must	  be	  viewed	  in	  context	   of	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   civil	  war	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   large-­‐scale	   political	  violence	  continue	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  country	  in	  question.	  34 	  Kritz,	  supra	  note	  4	  (phrase	  is	  used	  in	  the	  title).	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  Uzbekistan.35	   	   Although	   technically	   elected,	   it	   is	   fair	   to	   say	   that	  Karimov’s	   regime	   is	   non-­‐democratic.	   	   It	   is	   also	   fair	   to	   say	   that	  despite	   Karimov	   promising	   “step	   by	   step	   improvements,”	  systematic	   and	   very	   grave	   human	   rights	   violations	   continue	   to	  occur	   in	   Uzbekistan	   (most	   well-­‐known,	   perhaps,	   are	   the	  massacres	   of	   demonstrators	   in	   Andizhan	   in	   2005).36	   	   Again,	   the	  absence	  of	  studies	  of	  the	  Uzbek	  case	  seemingly	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	   that	   this	   case	   clearly	   departs	   from	   the	   expectation	   that	  transitional	  justice	  occurs	  in	  contexts	  of	  liberal	  transitions.37	  In	  Haiti,	  after	  returning	  from	  exile	  in	  1994	  to	  serve	  the	  rest	  of	  his	   presidency	   following	   three	   years	   of	   extremely	   repressive	  military	   rule	   under	   general	  Raul	   Cédras,	  Haitian	  President	   Jean-­‐Bertrand	   Aristide	   established	   a	   “Special	   Investigation	   Unit”	   to	  look	   into	   political	   violence	   committed	   before	   and	   under	   Cédras’	  regime	   (with	   little	   success,	   however,	   in	   bringing	   court	   cases).38	  	  Moreover,	   a	   truth	   commission	   was	   established	   to	   investigate	  serious	   human	   rights	   violations	   committed	   during	   military	   rule	  (but	   also	  with	   little	   success	   in	   fulfilling	   its	  mandate).39	   	   Aristide	  held	   a	  democratic	  mandate,	   state	   sponsored	  violence,	   at	   least	   in	  some	  periods,	  reduced	  under	  his	  presidency,	  and	  he	  managed	  to	  implement	  some	  reforms.40	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Aristide	  allegedly	  supported	  mob	  justice	  which	  targeted	  political	  opponents,	  called	  for	   violent	   gangs	   as	   a	   means	   of	   social	   control,	   and	   the	   Haitian	  police	  force,	  which	  was	  formed	  by	  Aristide	  to	  replace	  the	  army’s	  control	  of	   internal	   security,	  was	   involved	   in	  systematic	  and	  very	  grave	  human	  rights	  abuses.41	  	   35 On	  this	  point,	  and	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  commission,	  see	  Grodsky,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  285–86.	  36 See	  id.	  at	  292	  n.56.	  	  For	  recent	  accounts	  of	  how	  Karimov’s	  Uzbekistan	  deals	  with	  questions	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   democracy,	   see	   AMNESTY	   INTERNATIONAL,	  UZBEKISTAN:	   SUBMISSION	   TO	   THE	   UN	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   COMMITTEE	   (Apr.	   28,	   2009)	  http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR62/002/2009/en/a834e62b-­‐fcd5-­‐4391-­‐b44c	   	   	   -­‐f8d8fcc3f6a3/eur620022009en.pdf;	   Freedom	   in	   the	  World-­‐Uzbekistan	  
(2009),	   FREEDOM	   HOUSE	   (2009),	  http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009	  &country=7731	  (last	  visited	  Mar.	  17,	  2011).	  37 See	  Grodsky,	  supra	  note	  2	  (making	  a	  similar	  point).	  38 See,	  e.g.,	  Kenneth	  Roth,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Haitian	  Transition	  to	  Democracy,	  in	  HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   IN	   POLITICAL	   TRANSITIONS:	   GETTYSBURG	   TO	   BOSNIA	   93	   (Carla	   Hesse	   &	  Robert	  Post	  eds.,	  1999).	  39 See	   Joanna	   R.	   Quinn,	   Haiti’s	   Failed	   Truth	   Commission:	   Lessons	   in	   Transitional	  
Justice,	  8	  J.	  HUM.	  RTS.	  265	  (2009).	  40 See	  Roth,	  supra	  note	  38.	  41 The	  worst	  abuses	  under	  Aristide’s	  rule	  are	  said	  to	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  1991,	  and	  not	  when	  he	  returned	  to	  power	  in	  1994	  thru	  1996,	  the	  period	  when	  these	  measures	  of	   transitional	   justice	   were	   established.	   	   In	   2001,	   he	   was	   again	   elected	   president.	  	  However,	  in	  2004	  he	  was	  ousted	  by	  rebel	  groups,	  perhaps	  with	  U.S.	  assistance.	  	  For	  a	  detailed	   discussion	   of	   the	   early	   years,	   see	   Roth,	   supra	   note	   38.	   	   An	   excellent	  documentary	   by	   Danish	   filmmaker	   Asger	   Leth	   points	   to	   Aristide’s	   connection	   to	  rough	   gangsters	   in	   the	   slums	   of	   Cité	   Soleil	   (so-­‐called	   “Chimeres”),	   and	   presents	   an	  interesting	   perspective	   on	   the	   events	   that	   took	   place	   in	   2004.	   	   See	  GHOSTS	   OF	   CITÈ	  SOLEIL	  (Nordisk	  Film	  2006).	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   13	  Many	   more	   instances	   where	   one	   can	   question,	   to	   different	  extents,	  whether	  transitional	  justice	  occurs	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  a	  liberal	  regime	  can	  be	  mentioned.	  	  For	  example,	  following	  Yoweri	  Museveni’s	   takeover	   in	   1986,	   a	   Truth	   Commission	   was	  established	   in	   Uganda	   to	   investigate	   human	   rights	   violations	  committed	   during	   prior	   regimes.	   	   Museveni’s	   leadership	   quite	  clearly	  has	  been	  less	  repressive	  than	  Idi	  Amin’s	  or	  Milton	  Obote’s.	  	  Yet,	  not	  until	   the	  mid	  2000s	  were	  other	  political	  parties	  allowed	  to	   operate	   relatively	   freely.42	   	   There	  was,	   and	   continues	   to	  be,	   a	  number	  of	  restrictions	  on	  civil	  and	  political	  rights,	  and	  Museveni’s	  administration	   has	   been	   responsible	   for	   severe	   human	   rights	  abuses,	   in	  particular	   in	   its	  attempt	   to	   fight	   the	  Lord’s	  Resistance	  Army	   (LRA)	   in	   northern	   parts	   of	   the	   country.43	   	   In	   Ethiopia,	  criminal	   trials	   following	   the	   1991	   overthrow	   of	   the	   atrocious	  Mengistu	   regime	   take	   place	   in	   a	   context	   of	   semi-­‐authoritarian	  rule.44	   	   In	   Chad,	   a	   Truth	   Commission	   was	   set	   up	   by	   President	  Idriss	  Déby	  following	  his	  overthrow	  of	  Hissène	  Habré	  (1990),	  but	  it	   functioned	   in	  a	   context	  where	  Déby’s	  Patriotic	  Salvation	  Party	  was	   the	   only	   legal	   political	   organization,	   and	   with	   a	   regime	   in	  place	   that	   has	   itself	   been	   accused	   of	   systematic	   human	   rights	  abuses.45	  	  Also	  in	  Nigeria,	  a	  Truth	  Commission	  was	  set	  up	  in	  1999	  by	  newly,	  democratically	  elected	  President	  Olusegon	  Obasanjo.	  46	  	  Obasanjo,	  however,	  ruled	  the	  country	  as	  a	  military	  dictator	   from	  1976–1979,	   and	   while	   serving	   as	   a	   democratically	   elected	  
	   42 See	  Roger	  Tangri,	  Politics	  and	  Presidential	  Term	  Limits	  in	  Uganda,	  in	  LEGACIES	  OF	  POWER:	   LEADERSHIP	   CHANGE	   AND	   FORMER	   PRESIDENTS	   IN	   AFRICAN	   POLITICS	   175	   (Roger	  Southall	  &	  Henning	  Melber	  eds.,	  2006).	  43 On	   the	   “Commission	   of	   Inquiry	   into	   Violations	   of	   Human	   Rights”	   set	   up	   by	  Museveni,	   see	   PRISCILLA	   B.	   HAYNER,	   UNSPEAKABLE	   TRUTHS	   56–57	   (2001).	   	   On	  Museveni’s	   human	   rights	   record,	   see,	   e.g.,	   Susan	   Dicklitch	   &	   Doreen	   Lwanga,	   The	  
Politics	   of	   Being	   Non-­‐Political:	   Human	   Rights	   Organizations	   and	   the	   Creation	   of	   a	  
Positive	   Human	   Rights	   Culture	   in	   Uganda,	   25	   HUM.	   RTS.	   Q.	   482	   (2003).	   	   More	  specifically	   on	   human	   rights	   violations	   committed	   in	   northern	   Uganda,	   see,	   e.g.,	  BACKGROUND	   ON	   THE	   CONFLICT	   IN	   NORTHERN	   UGANDA	   (2009),	   http://icar.gmn.edu	  /ICC/Background.pdf	   (concerning	   international	   crimes	   committed	   by	   the	   Ugandan	  army	   in	   its	   fight	  against	   the	  LRA);	  see	  also,	  Get	   the	  Gun!	  Human	  Rights	  Violations	  by	  
Uganda’s	  National	  Army	  in	  Law	  Enforcement	  Operations	  in	  the	  Karamoja	  Region,	  HUM.	  RTS.	   WATCH	   (2007),	   http://www.hrw.org/en/node/10693/section/1	   (concerning	  violations	  committed	  during	  operations	  aimed	  at	  combating	  the	  proliferation	  of	  small	  arms	  and	  cattle	  rustling).	  44 For	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “red	  terror”	  trials,	  which	  have	  taken	  place	  since	  the	  ousting	  of	  Mengistu’s	  regime,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Firew	  Kebede	  Tiba,	  The	  Mengistu	  Genocide	  
Trial	  in	  Ethiopia,	  5	  J.	  INT’L	  CRIM.	  JUST.	  513	  (2007).	   	  On	  the	  political	  and	  human	  rights	  climate	   following	   the	   Ethiopian	   People’s	   Revolutionary	   Democratic	   Front’s	  overthrow	   of	   the	   Dergue,	   and	   later	   under	   president	   Gidada	   following	   the	   1995	  elections,	   see,	   e.g.,	   John	   W.	   Harbeson,	   A	   Bureaucratic	   Authoritarian	   Regime,	   9	   J.	  DEMOCRACY	  62,	  66	  (1998)	  (characterizing	  the	  regime	  as	  an	  “essentially	  bureaucratic-­‐authoritarian	  regime	  dependent	  upon	  the	  EPRDF’s	  superior	  military	  muscle”).	  45 See	  HAYNER,	   supra	  note	  43,	   at	  57–59.	   	  See	  also	  Reed	  Brody,	  The	  Prosecution	  of	  
Hissène	   Habré:	   International	   Accountability,	   National	   Impunity,	   in	   TRANSITIONAL	  JUSTICE	  IN	  THE	  TWENTY-­‐FIRST	  CENTURY,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  278.	  46 On	  the	  truth	  commission,	  see	  HAYNER,	  supra	  note	  43,	  at	  69–70.	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   he	   was	   responsible	   for	   serious	   abuses—for	   example,	  Obasanjo	  endorsed	  the	  army’s	  atrocities	  in	  the	  Niger	  Delta.47	  Because	   these	   cases	   of	   transitional	   justice	   under	   non-­‐liberal	  regimes	  have	  endless	  differences,	  it	  makes	  little	  sense	  to	  attempt	  to	   generalize	   much	   on	   them.	   	   However,	   some	   important	   points	  can	   be	   made	   which	   are	   crucial	   for	   understanding	   challenges	   to	  transitional	  justice	  theory.	  Where	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  reasonable	  assumption	  that	  relatively	  liberal	   regimes	   may	   use	   transitional	   justice	   to	   consolidate	  democracy,	  strengthen	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  in	  other	  ways	  open	  up	  what	  was	  before	   restricted,	   the	   assumption	  must	   be	   that	   a	   non-­‐liberal	   leadership	  will	  not	  prioritize	   transitional	   justice	   for	   these	  reasons.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  in	  non-­‐liberal	  transitions	  one	  reason	  for	  the	  new	  leadership	  to	  establish	  processes	  of	  transitional	  justice	  is	  that	   these	   processes	   are	   intended	   to	   facilitate	   restrictions	   on	  freedoms	  and	  consolidate	  non-­‐democratic	  and	  repressive	  rule.	  In	   Rwanda,	   postponing	   the	   elections	   to	   2003	   must	   be	  understood	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   perceived	   need	   for	   re-­‐educating	  the	  population.	   	  The	  Saturday	  Talks—a	  series	  of	  meetings	  which	  involved	   Rwandan	   political	   leaders—explained	   how	   “[n]obody	  can	   think	   about	   introducing	   democracy	   in	   Rwanda	   before	  teaching	   about	   the	   people’s	   rights;	   not	   killing	   and	   all	   other	   bad	  actions	  which	  have	  been	  canned	  out	  on	  behalf	  of	  democracy;	  and	  standing	   against	   bad	   ideology	   based	   on	   sectarianism.”48	  	  According	   to	   Filip	  Reyntjens,	   in	   2002,	   then	  General	   Secretary	   of	  the	   National	   Unity	   and	   Reconciliation	   Commission,	   Aloysia	  Inyumba	   (who	   is	   also	   a	   prominent	   RPF	   leader),	   explained	   that	  “the	   ordinary	   citizens	   are	   like	   babies.	   They	   will	   need	   to	   be	  completely	  educated	  before	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  democracy.”49	   	  To	  facilitate	   this,	   the	   Saturday	   Talks	   noted	   how	   “solidarity	   camps”	  (which	  later	  became	  known	  as	  “Ingando	  Camps”)	  would	  be	  useful	  for	   raising	   awareness	   and	   re-­‐educating	   Rwandans.50	   	   These	  camps	   have	   provided	   civic	   education	   for	   a	   large	   spectrum	   of	  groups	   in	   Rwandan	   society,	   but	   are	   alleged	   to	   disseminate	   RPF	  ideology	   and	   to	   oppose	   dialogue	   and	   diverse	   perceptions	   of	  identity	  and	  existence	  in	  post-­‐genocide	  Rwanda.51	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  a	   reasonable	   hypothesis	   that	   excluding	   RPF	   crimes	   (serious	  abuses	  committed	  by	  members	  of	   the	  current	  regime	  during	   the	  	   47 See,	  e.g.,	  Nigeria:	  President	  Ignoring	  Gravity	  of	  Military	  Massacre,	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  WATCH	  (2002),	  http://www.hrw.org/en/node/66116.	  48 OFFICE	  OF	  THE	  PRESIDENT	  OF	  THE	  REPUBLIC	  OF	  RWANDA,	  REPORT	  ON	  THE	  REFLECTION	  MEETINGS	   HELD	   IN	   THE	   OFFICE	   OF	   THE	   PRESIDENT	   OF	   THE	   REPUBLIC	   FROM	  MAY	   1998	   TO	  MARCH	  1999,	  at	  37	  (1999),	  available	  at	  http://www.grandslacs.net/doc	  /2378.pdf.	  49 Reyntjens,	  supra	  note	  25,	  at	  183–84	  (internal	  quotation	  marks	  omitted).	  50 REPORT	  ON	  THE	  REFLECTION	  MEETINGS	  HELD	  IN	  THE	  OFFICE	  OF	  THE	  PRESIDENT	  OF	  THE	  REPUBLIC	  FROM	  MAY	  1998	  TO	  MARCH	  1999,	  supra	  note	  48,	  at	  46–47.	  51 See,	   e.g.,	   Chi	   Mgbako,	   Ingando	   Solidarity	   Camps:	   Reconciliation	   and	   Political	  
Indoctrination	  in	  Post-­‐Genocide	  Rwanda,	  18	  HARV.	  HUM.	  RTS.	  J.	  201	  (2005).	  
2011]	   Transitional	  Justice	   15	  civil	  war)	  from	  the	  sphere	  of	  transitional	  justice,	  and	  prohibiting	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  ethnic-­‐related	  statements	  should	  be	  viewed	  in	  context	  of	  the	  RPF’s	  particular	  understanding	  of	  the	  genocide,	  and	  that	   these	  measures,	   in	   part,	   serve	   to	   consolidate	   RPF’s	   grip	   on	  power,	  for	  example	  by	  limiting	  criticism	  of	  the	  government,	  while	  portraying	  the	  RPF	  take-­‐over	  as	  a	  “national	  salvation.”52	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  other	  cases	  with	  similarly	  good	  reasons	  to	   believe	   that	   transitional	   justice	   is	   brought	   into	   play	  with	   the	  purpose	   of	   limiting	   and	   intimidating	   political	   opposition,	   and	   in	  other	  ways	  justifying	  restrictions	  of	  freedoms.	  	  As	  one	  of	  few	  who	  have	   commented	   on	   Chad’s	   truth	   commission,	   Priscilla	   Hayner	  notes,	  the	  same	  government	  of	  Chad	  that	  created	  this	  commission	  has	  been	   accused	   of	   serious	   human	   rights	   violations	   itself,	   which	  called	  into	  question	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  government	  in	  setting	  up	   the	   commission.	   	   Some	   human	   rights	   observers	   had	   the	  impression	  that	  the	  commission	  was	  set	  up	  to	  improve	  the	  new	  president’s	   image.	   	   Despite	   the	  many	   years	   of	  U.S.	   support	   for	  the	   Habré	   regime,	   one	   U.S.	   State	   Department	   official,	   when	  asked	   about	   the	   commission,	   said,	   “Wasn’t	   that	   just	   Déby	  proving	  that	  Habré	  was	  an	  SOB?”53	  In	  a	   rare	  analysis	  of	   the	  Uzbek	   truth	  commission,	  Brian	  Grodsky	  remarks	   that	   “the	   very	   repression	   that	   has	   allowed	   Karimov	   to	  control	   the	  state	  and	  most	  of	  society	  has	  created	  conditions	   that	  make	   transitional	   justice	   possible	   and	   even	   likely,”	   in	   part	  because	  Karimov	   has	   a	   need	   for	   blaming	   his	   poor	   human	   rights	  record	   on	   something,	   and	   also	   because	   making	   reference	   to	  difficulties	   in	   overcoming	   structures	   put	   in	   place	   during	   the	  Soviet	  era	  is	  a	  convenient	  strategy.54	  With	   the	   partial	   exception	   of	   studies	   of	   the	   Rwandan	   case,	  discussing	   how	   transitional	   justice	   can	   limit	   liberalization	   and	  democratization	   has	   not	   exactly	   dominated	   transitional	   justice	  discourses.	   	   Generally	   speaking,	   the	   scholarship	   appears	   to	   lack	  interest	   in	   these	   cases	   of	   non-­‐liberal	   transitions,	   and	   how	   these	  cases	   may	   affect	   our	   understanding	   of	   transitional	   justice.	  	  Arguably,	   this	   lack	   of	   interest	   has	   to	   do	  with	   the	   fact	   that	  most	  observers	   think	   of	   transitional	   justice	   as	   something	   that	   is	  inherently	  “good,”	  at	   least	  to	  the	  extent	  it	  preserves	  the	  rights	  of	  victims	   and	  perpetrators.	   	  As	  Grodsky	  points	   out	  with	   regard	   to	  	   52 See,	   e.g.,	   Allison	   Corey	   &	   Sandra	   F.	   Joireman,	  Retributive	   Justice:	   The	   GACACA	  
Courts	  in	  Rwanda,	  103	  AFR.	  AFF.	  73	  (2004).	  53 HAYNER,	   supra	  note	   43,	   at	   57–59.	   	   A	   similar	   concern	   is	   expressed	   in	   Grodsky,	  
supra	   note	   2,	   at	   285–86	   (noting	   how	   the	   new	   repressive	   leadership	   celebrated	   the	  commission	   because	   it	   condemned	   the	   old	   elites	   and	   therefore	   was	   “politically	  expedient”).	  54 Because	  Karimov	  allegedly	  seeks	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  the	  Russians,	  his	  new	  friendship	  with	  Western	  countries	  who	  needs	  a	  platform	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	  world	  to	  fight	   the	  War	  on	  Terrorism	  are	  willing	  to	  provide	  aid	  on	  these	  terms.	   	  See	  Grodsky,	  
supra	  note	  2,	  at	  289.	  
16	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  1	  truth	   commissions	   used	   in	   non-­‐liberal	   transitions,	   these	   have	  “received	   little	   more	   than	   dismissive	   notes	   in	   the	   oft	   pro-­‐truth	  commission	   transitional	   justice	   literature.”55	   	   But	   such	  observations	   are	   also	   valid	   for	   other	   measures	   of	   transitional	  justice	  used	  by	  non-­‐democratic	  and	  repressive	  leaders.	  There	   are	   at	   least	   two	   immediate	   implications	   of	   transitional	  justice’s	   ability	   to	   limit	   liberal	   values.	   	   First,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	  more	   rigorous	   scrutiny	   of	   the	   intentions	   behind	   establishing	  transitional	   justice	  mechanisms	  and,	   in	  particular,	   at	   the	   level	  of	  the	  general	   scholarship,	  a	  need	   for	  adjusting	   the	  perception	   that	  transitional	   justice	  generally	  aims	  at,	  and	  achieves,	   liberalization	  and	  democratization.	  Second,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   investors	   in	   transitional	   justice	   to	  consider	  more	  carefully	  whether	  or	  not	  processes	  of	   transitional	  justice	   deserve	   funding	   and	   moral	   backing.	   	   As	   Grodsky	   points	  out,	   one	   motivation	   for	   non-­‐liberal	   rulers	   to	   embark	   on	  transitional	   justice	   can	   be	   that	   the	   provision	   of	   resources	   (for	  example	   loans	   and	   aid)	   and	   international	   recognition	   have	  become	  closely	  linked	  to	  a	  commitment	  to	  address	  past	  abuses.56	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   foreign	   investment	   in	   transitional	   justice	  under	   non-­‐liberal	   rule	   should	   not	   necessarily	   be	   rejected	  altogether	   because	   these	   processes	   may	   nonetheless	   hold	  potential	  for	  supporting	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  In	  part,	  this	  is	  so	  because	  initiatives	  can	  change	  shape	  when	  international	  actors	   are	   involved.	   	   Categorically	   rejecting	   transitional	   justice	  under	  non-­‐liberal	  rule	  may	  thus	  fail	   to	  acknowledge	  that	  dealing	  with	  past	  atrocities	  in	  these	  cases	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  transitional	   justice	   processes	   are	   altogether	   miscalculated	   in	  furthering	  liberal	  values.	  	  In	  Rwanda,	  for	  example,	  certain	  aspects	  of	   transitional	   justice,	   such	   as	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   “judicial	  defenders	   corps”	   (paralegals	   with	   limited	   training)	   to	   provide	  legal	  assistance	  in	  genocide	  cases,	  has	  had	  important	  advantages	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  In	  particular,	  these	  paralegals	  have	   proved	   important	   for	   advancing	   access	   to	   justice,	   also	   for	  other	   types	   of	   cases	   than	   those	   relating	   to	   genocide	   justice,	   and	  the	   paralegals	   have	   helped	   increase	   awareness	   of	   legal	  procedures	  among	  the	  general	  public.57	  Connected	   to	   both	   of	   these	   immediate	   implications,	   a	   more	  profound	   question	   arises:	   is	   a	   normative	   framework,	   heavily	  	   55 Id.	  at	  282.	  56 Id.	  at	  291	  (arguing	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  U.S.	  almost	  doubled	  its	  aid	  to	  33	  million	  U.S.	  dollars	  in	  1999	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  Uzbek	  leaders’	  willingness	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  past).	  57 For	   further	   analysis	   of	   the	   judicial	   defenders	   corps	   and	   its	   contribution	   to	  access	   to	   justice	   in	  post-­‐genocide	  Rwanda,	   see	  Thomas	  Obel	  Hansen,	  Human	  Rights	  
and	  Transitional	  Societies:	  Contemporary	  Challenges,	  in	  ACTIVATING	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  AND	  PEACE:	   UNIVERSAL	   RESPONSIBILITY	   CONFERENCE	   2008	   CONFERENCE	   PROCEEDINGS	   131	  (Robert	  Garbutt	  ed.,	  2008).	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  influenced	   by	   the	   transitions	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	   Central	   and	  Eastern	   Europe,	   actually	   suitable	   for	   attending	   to	   cases	   of	  transitional	   justice	   under	   non-­‐liberal	   regimes?	   	   Evaluating	  processes	   of	   transitional	   justice	   according	   to	   their	   ability	   to	  strengthen	   liberal	   values	   is	   relevant,	   but	   insufficient,	   when	  analyzing	   law	   and	   justice	   in	   non-­‐liberal	   transitions.	   	   Passing	  judgments	   on	   the	   value	   of	   transitional	   justice	   processes,	  predominantly	   (or	   alone)	   by	   calling	   into	   question	   their	  conformity	   with	   democracy	   and	   rule	   of	   law	   ideals,	   may	   fail	   to	  acknowledge	   that	   these	   processes	   can	   serve	   other	   vital	   and	  legitimate	   interests.	   	   Whereas	   this	   observation	   is	   also	   relevant	  when	   dealing	   with	   transitional	   justice	   in	   liberal	   transitions,	  focusing	  primarily	  on	   liberal	  values	  when	  evaluating	  transitional	  justice	   under	   non-­‐liberal	   transitions	   may	   pose	   particular	  challenges.	  Key	   to	   such	   problems	   is	   that	   concepts	   such	   as	   pluralism,	  democracy,	   and	  human	   rights	   can	   sometimes	  be	   in	   tension	  with	  other	  desirable	  objectives,	  such	  as	  nation	  building,58	  security,	  and	  peace.59	   	   Put	   otherwise,	   we	   cannot	   exclude	   the	   possibility	   that	  transitional	   justice	   in	   non-­‐liberal	   transitions	   can,	   from	   certain	  perspectives,	  be	  valuable	  because	  it	  limits	  liberal	  values,	  such	  as	  a	  pluralistic	   democracy	   and	   certain	   freedom	   rights,	   in	   order	   to	  benefit	  goals	  such	  as	  security	  and	  peace.	  In	   Rwanda,	   one	   key	   challenge	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	  transitional	   justice	   is	   that	   we	   cannot	   easily	   dismiss	   the	   RPF’s	  claims	   in	   the	  mid	   and	   late	   1990s	   (but	   not	   necessarily	   later	   on)	  that	  Rwanda	  was	  not	  ready	   for	  democracy.60	   	  Similarly,	   it	  makes	  some	  sense	  when	  the	  Rwandan	  leadership	  argues	  that	  a	  number	  of	   human	   rights,	   such	   as	   freedom	   of	   expression,	   had	   to	   be	  seriously	  restricted	  given	  the	  genocide	  context;	  when	  arguing	  that	  offering	  increased	  space	  for	  political	  opposition	  could	  potentially	  endanger	   security	   and	   peace;	   and	   when	   seemingly	   considering	  transitional	  justice	  a	  valuable	  project	  because	  it	  helps	  to	  facilitate	  these	  purposes.	  	  In	  particular,	  this	  is	  so	  because	  the	  genocide	  was	  organized	   as	   a	   response	   of	   extremist	   powers	   to	   the	  democratization	   process	   taking	   place	   at	   the	   time,	   and	   these	  powers,	   who	   maintained	   influence	   in	   the	   broader	   population	  following	   the	   1994	   transition,	   relied	   significantly	   on	  disseminating	   their	   ideology	   through	   the	  radio	  and	  other	  media.	  	  	   58 Nation	   building	   is	   loosely	   understood	   here	   as	   leaders’	   deliberate	   attempt	   of	  constructing	  one	  national	   identity.	   	  For	   further	  discussions	  of	   this	  concept,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Juan	   J.	   Linz,	   State	   Building	   and	   Nation	   Building,	   1	   EUR.	   REV.	   335	   (1993).	   	   See	   also	  Walker	   Conner,	   Nation-­‐Building	   or	   Nation-­‐Destroying,	   24	   WORLD	   POL.	   319	   (1972)	  (noting	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  “nation-­‐state”	  is	  not	  a	  desirable	  per	  se).	  59 Security	   is	   here	   understood	   as	   something	   more	   short-­‐term	   and	   narrow	   than	  (positive)	  peace.	  60 REPORT	  ON	  THE	  REFLECTION	  MEETINGS	  HELD	  IN	  THE	  OFFICE	  OF	  THE	  PRESIDENT	  OF	  THE	  REPUBLIC	  FROM	  MAY	  1998	  TO	  MARCH	  1999,	  supra	  note	  48,	  at	  37.	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  1	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   justice	   in	   Rwanda	   as	   altogether	   flawed—because	  in	  important	  aspects,	  it	  fails	  to	  live	  up	  to	  expectations	  of	  liberal	   change—is	   easy,	   but	   not	   necessarily	   sufficient.	   	   The	  implications	   of	   transitional	   justice	   in	   Rwanda—such	   as	  restrictions	  on	  freedom	  of	  expression	  (for	  example	  in	  the	  form	  of	  passing	  legislation	  on	  divisionism	  and	  genocide	  ideology);	  the	  use	  of	   transitional	   justice	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   executive’s	   control,	  which	   at	   times	   contravenes	   with	   human	   rights	   standards	   (the	  lengthy	   detentions	   and	   the	   trials	   of	   more	   than	   one	   million	  genocide	   cases	   in	   Gacaca	   Courts);	   and	   the	   use	   of	   transitional	  justice	   to	   limit	   pluralism	   by	   endorsing	   one	   particular	  understanding	   of	   Rwandan	   history	   while	   rejecting	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   liberal	   democracy	   (Ingando	   camps	   and	  restrictions	   on	   political	   opposition	   through	   legal	   reforms)—entails	  a	  number	  of	  problems,	  but	  cannot	  simply	  be	  dismissed	  as	  
altogether	   illegitimate	   purposes.	   	   While	   it	   is	   of	   significant	  importance	   to	   point	   to	   flaws	   in	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   such	   processes	  should	  also	  be	  evaluated	  by	  discussing	  what	  other	  ends	  they	  are	  intended	  to	  further,	  by	  how	  they	  actually	  manage	  to	  further	  these	  ends,	  and	  by	  appreciating	  the	  value	  of	  these	  particular	  ends—not	  only	   according	   to	   universal	   standards,	   but	   also	   in	   a	   context-­‐specific	  understanding	  of	  relevant	  goals.	  In	   particular,	   the	   fact	   that	   Rwanda	   has	   embarked	   so	  comprehensively	  on	  a	   range	  of	  measures	   that	  deal	  with	   legacies	  of	  political	  violence,	  viewed	  in	  context	  of	  a	  determined	  and	  strong	  executive	   branch	   of	   government,	   may	   be	   correlated	   to	   the	  establishment	   of	   an	   environment	   that	   is,	   at	   least	   temporarily,	  relatively	   secure.61	   	   Furthermore,	   transitional	   justice’s	   ability	   to	  reconcile	   individuals	   and	   communities	   is	   certainly	   crucial	   for	  evaluating	  the	  Rwandan	  case.	   	  While	   the	  notion	  of	  reconciliation	  is	   also	   familiar	   from	   some	   cases	   of	   liberal	   transitions	   (in	  particular	  the	  South	  African),62	  reconciliation	  may	  have	  a	  specific	  meaning	  in	  the	  Rwandan	  case.	  	  Some,	  for	  example,	  will	  argue	  that	  national	  reconciliation	  in	  Rwanda	  requires	  that	  Hutu	  and	  Tutsi	  be	  abandoned	  as	  political	  identities.63	  	   61 However,	   it	   should	  be	  noted	  here	   that	   the	  question	  of	  whether	   the	   “Rwandan	  model”	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   productive	   for	   long-­‐term	   peace	   may	   be	   different	   from	   the	  question	  of	  short-­‐term	  peace	  and	  security.	  62 See,	   e.g.,	   Hugo	   van	   der	   Merwe,	   National	   and	   Community	   Reconciliation:	  
Competing	   Agendas	   in	   the	   South	   African	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	   Commission,	   in	  BURYING	   THE	   PAST:	  MAKING	   PEACE	   AND	  DOING	   JUSTICE	  AFTER	   CIVIL	   CONFLICT	   101	   (Nigel	  Biggar	  ed.,	  2003).	  63 See,	   e.g.,	   MAHMOOD	   MAMDANI,	   WHEN	   VICTIMS	   BECOME	   KILLERS:	   COLONIALISM,	  NATIVISM,	   AND	   THE	   GENOCIDE	   IN	   RWANDA	   276-­‐79	   (2001).	   	   For	   a	   methodologically	  rigorous	  analysis	  of	  whether	  transitional	  justice	  in	  Rwanda	  (here	  the	  Gacaca	  Courts)	  is	  likely	  to	  promote	  reconciliation,	  see	  Phil	  Clark,	  Hybridity,	  Holism,	  and	  “Traditional”	  
Justice:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Gacaca	  Courts	  in	  Post-­‐Genocide	  Rwanda,	  39	  GEO.	  WASH.	  INT’L	  L.	  REV.	   765	   (2007)	   (arguing	   that	   the	   key	   aspect	   of	   Gacaca	   in	   this	   regard	   concerns	   its	  emphasis	   on	   engagement	   through	   popular	   participation).	   	   Other	   observers	   remain	  more	   skeptical	   toward	   Gacaca’s	   support	   for	   reconciliation.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   Corey	   &	  
 
2011]	   Transitional	  Justice	   19	  Because	  the	  subjects	  of	  reconciliation	  and	  peace	  in	  accounts	  of	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  Rwandan	  are	  in	  fact	  subjected	  to	  much	  analysis,	  the	   key	   challenge	   to	   the	   field	   is	   not	   that	   other	   potential	  contributions	   of	   transitional	   justice	   are	   overlooked	   in	   case	  studies.	  	  Much	  more,	  the	  challenge	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  there	  has	  only	  been	  a	  limited	  engagement	  at	  the	  level	  of	  general	  theory	  with	  the	  question	  of	  when	  the	  pursuit	  of	  objectives	  which	  may	  run	  counter	  to	   liberal	  values	  should	  be	  supported.64	   	  Although	  concepts	  such	  as	   reconciliation	   have	   gained	   a	   prominent	   place	   in	   transitional	  justice	   discourses,65	   discussing	   questions	   of	   when,	   how,	   and	   to	  what	   extent	   it	   is	   justified	   that	   transitional	   justice	   is	   used	   for	  purposes	   of	   reconciliation,	   nation	   building,	   a	   strengthening	   of	  security,	   and	   so	   forth,	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   liberalization	   and	  democratization,	   remains	   largely	   off	   the	   table	   in	   general	  transitional	   justice	   theory.	   	   A	   key	   task	   for	   the	   scholarship,	  therefore,	   is	   to	   consider	  more	   rigorously	   how	   tensions	   between	  various	  claims	  of	  transitional	  justice	  should	  be	  dealt	  with.	  	  It	  is	  too	  easy	   simply	   to	   dismiss	   transitional	   justice	   as	   illegitimate	   in	  instances	   of	   non-­‐liberal	   transition	   because	   these	   processes	   in	  important	   aspects	   may	   fail	   to	   live	   up	   to	   conventional	   ideas	   of	  what	  transitional	  justice	  can	  and	  should	  do.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  too	  easy	  to	  say	  that	  transitional	  justice	  should	  only	  be	  evaluated	  according	   to	   a	   context-­‐specific	   understanding	   of	   values,	   or	   that	  purposes	   of	   security	   or	   reconciliation	   should	   generally	   override	  liberalization	  and	  democratization	   in	   these	   instances.	   	  Accepting	  that	   there	   are	   no	   simple	   solutions	   to	   these	   problems,	   at	   least	  three	   issues	  are	   crucial	   to	   take	   into	  account	  when	  attempting	   to	  strike	  a	  balance.	  The	   first	   issue	   requires	   discussions	   of	   the	   injustices	   that	  transitional	  justice	  is	  to	  deal	  with.	  	  The	  kinds	  of	  past	  wrongs	  dealt	  with	   by	   means	   of	   transitional	   justice	   are	   extremely	   diverse.	  	  Military	   regimes’	   extra-­‐legal	   repression	   in	   Latin	   American	  countries,	  oppression	  and	  lack	  of	  freedoms	  under	  communist	  rule	  in	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   Europe,	   structural	   violence	   and	   injustice	  during	   South	   Africa’s	   Apartheid	   rule,	   devastating	   civil	   wars	   and	  state-­‐sponsored	   violence	   in	   Haiti	   and	   Nicaragua,	   and	   crimes	  against	   humanity	   and	   genocide	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Rwanda’s	   civil	  war	   represent	   very	   different	   legacies	   of	   violence	   and	   injustice.	  	  Key	   differences	   concern	   the	   scope	   and	   gravity	   of	   violence	   and	  suffering;	   the	   level	   of	   popular	   participation	   in	   abuses,	   and	   the	  question	   of	   whether	   violations	   can	   primarily	   be	   attributed	   to	  	  Joireman,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  88	  (noting	  that	  “[l]eaving	  accused	  Tutsi	  out	  of	  the	  gacaca	  process	   endangers	   any	   effort	   at	   true	   reconciliation,	   since	   reconciliation	   requires	  accountability”).	  64 See,	  however,	  Phil	  Clark’s	  recent	  account	  of	  “key	  themes”	  in	  transitional	  justice,	  which	  is	  valuable	  because	  it	  highlights	  the	  need	  to	  think	  in	  broader	  terms	  about	  the	  normative	  framework.	  	  See	  Clark,	  supra	  note	  3.	  65 See,	  e.g.,	  AFTER	  GENOCIDE,	  supra	  note	  3.	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  agencies,	  or	  if	  other	  entities	  such	  as	  rebel	  groups	  were	  also	  responsible	  for	  abuses;	  the	  time	  span	  of	  repressive	  governance	  or	  conflict;	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   legacies	   of	   injustices	   had	  prevailed	  prior	   to	   the	  most	   recent	  outbreak	  of	  violence;	   and	   the	  level	  of	  support	  within	  segments	  of	  the	  population	  for	  repressive	  governance	  or	  violence.	   	  Some	  may	  argue	  that	  we	  should	  simply	  distinguish	   between	   authoritarian	   regimes	   and	   other	   forms	   of	  repressive	  governance	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	   and	   civil	  war	  and	  other	  forms	   of	   large-­‐scale	   conflict	   on	   the	   other.	   	   This	   approach,	  however,	   easily	   runs	   into	   a	   number	   of	   problems,	   for	   instance,	  because	   civil	   war	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   large-­‐scale	   conflict	  frequently	   occur	   with	   an	   authoritarian	   government	   in	   place.66	  	  Nonetheless,	   it	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   argue	   for	   a	   more	   flexible	  approach	   to	   liberalization	   and	   democratization	   in	   cases	   of	  mass	  violence	   than	   in	   cases	   of	   limited	   repression	   under	   an	  authoritarian	   regime.	   	   In	   some	   cases,	   such	   as	  many	   of	   the	   Latin	  American,	   rights-­‐violations	  were	   intimately	   linked	   to	  a	   “national	  security	  doctrine”	  which	  had	   stipulated	   the	  necessity	  of	  military	  rule.67	   	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  abuses	  were	  committed	  by	  a	  relatively	  limited	  set	  of	  actors	  and	  these	  actors	  tended	  to	  target	  individuals	  within	   relatively	   well-­‐defined	   groups.68	   	   In	   other	   cases,	   such	   as	  the	   Rwandan,	   a	   very	   large	   number	   of	   ordinary	   citizens	   were	  agents	   of	   political	   violence	   and	   very	   large	   numbers	   of	   ordinary	  citizens	   were	   victimized.	   	   Such	   differences	   may	   be	   determining	  factors	  for	  the	  weight	  given	  to	  different	  objectives.	  	  The	  existence	  of	  guilty	  masses,	  for	  example,	  can	  make	  it	  impossible	  to	  adhere	  to	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  (as	  is	  evident	  in	  some	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  Rwandan,	   from	  a	   tension	  between	  accountability	  norms	  and	  fair	   trial	   norms),	   thus	   calling	   into	   question	   the	   idea	   that	  transitional	   justice	   should	   be	   judged	   by	   usual	   standards.	  	  Furthermore,	   in	   some	   cases	   a	   pressing	   need	   is	   not	   only	   to	  (re)establish	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   but	   also	   to	  make	   groups	   in	   society	  want	  to	  coexist,	  and	  for	  the	  state	  to	  survive.	  	  In	  addition,	  to	  avoid	  the	  return	  to	  conflict	   following	   identity-­‐based	  conflict	  with	  mass	  involvement	   it	   may	   be	   necessary	   to	   have	   a	   strong	   and	   decisive	  government	   in	   place,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	  conflict	  (whereas	  what	  was	  seemingly	  the	  most	  pressing	  need	  in	  many	  Latin	  American	  countries	  in	  the	  1980s	  was	  a	  return	  to	  civil	  governance	  and	  respect	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  including	  individuals’	  freedoms).	  	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  nature	  of	  violence	  and	  injustice,	  and	  	   66 The	  “Dirty	  War”	  in	  Argentina,	  for	  example,	  was	  connected	  to	  guerrillas	  fighting	  the	   military	   regime,	   at	   least	   until	   1976.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   David	   Pion-­‐Berlin,	   The	   National	  
Security	   Doctrine,	   Military	   Threat	   Perception,	   and	   the	   “Dirty	   War”	   in	   Argentina,	   21	  COMP.	  POL.	  STUD.	  382	  (1988).	  67 For	   a	   critical	   review	   of	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   Latin	   American	   military	   regimes	  (here	  primarily	  the	  Argentine)	  were	  informed	  by	  the	  “national	  security	  doctrine,”	  see	  
id.	   at	   383	   (concluding	   that	   the	   armed	   forces	  practiced	   “selective	   vision,	  magnifying	  those	  components	  of	  the	  doctrine	  they	  liked	  and	  losing	  sight	  of	  the	  rest”).	  68 Id.	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  in	  particular	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  abuses	  occurred	  as	  part	  of	  an	   identity-­‐based	   conflict	   with	   mass	   participation	   and	   mass	  victimization,	   may	   be	   central	   when	   considering	   how	   to	   strike	   a	  balance	  between	  liberal	  goals	  and	  other	  important	  objectives.	  The	   second	   issue	   requires	   that	   attention	   be	   paid	   to	   current	  affairs.	   	   In	   cases	   where	   continued	   mass	   violence	   or	   extreme	  instability	   characterize	   the	   conditions	   in	   which	   transitional	  justice	   is	   deployed,	   a	   more	   supportive	   position	   towards	  prioritizing	  security	  and	  peace	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  liberal	  values	  may	  be	  justified.	  	  In	  cases	  such	  as	  Nicaragua,	  Haiti,	  and,	  to	  a	  certain	  point,	  Rwanda,	   transitional	   justice	   is	   carried	  out	  while	   the	  new	  regime	  remains	  involved	  in	  an	  armed	  struggle	  with	  supporters	  of	  the	  old	  regime	   or	   other	   violent	   groups.69	   	   Arguably,	   expectations	   that	  transitional	   justice	   in	   such	   instances	   should	   primarily	   further	  liberal	  values	  will	  tend	  to	  overlook	  that	  stability	  and	  security	  can	  be	   more	   pressing	   needs	   than	   consolidating	   liberal	   democratic	  rule.	   	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  should	  of	  course	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  continued	  rejection	  of	  liberalization	  and	  democratization	  may	  be	  underlying	  causes	  of	  the	  conflict.	  The	   third	   issue	   requires	   that	   the	   level	   of	   poverty	   and	   the	  existence	   of	   well-­‐functioning	   state	   institutions	   be	   taken	   into	  consideration.	   	   Human	   poverty—broadly	   understood	   to	   include	  the	   lack	   of	   education,	   among	   other	   things—and	   the	   absence	   of	  well-­‐functioning	   state	   institutions	   or	   their	   limited	   reach	  may	   be	  determining	  factors	  for	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  realistic	  to	  expect	  that	  transitional	  justice	  can	  further	  liberal	  democratic	  rule.	  	  Those	  societies	   loosely	   referred	   to	   as	   liberal	   in	   this	   article	   tend	   to	   be	  characterized	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  relatively	  well-­‐functioning	  state	  institutions,	   and	   they	   are	   usually	   wealthier	   than	   the	   societies	  referred	  to	  as	  non-­‐liberal.70	   	  Countries	  such	  as	  Haiti	  and	  Rwanda	  launched	   a	   transitional	   justice	   process	   at	   a	   time	   when	   these	  countries	   faced	   significant	   problems	   concerning	   poverty,	   lack	   of	  basic	  state	  institutions	  and	  were	  attempting	  to	  commence	  a	  post-­‐conflict	   reconstruction.	   	   In	   these	   instances,	  what	   should	  be	   seen	  as	   legitimate	   interests	  with	  transitional	   justice	  may	  deviate	  from	  interests	   in	   societies	   with	   more	   well-­‐established	   institutions.	  	  Establishing	   a	   liberal	   democracy,	   in	   other	   words,	   is	   not	  necessarily	   the	  most	   pressing	   need	   in	   extremely	   poverty-­‐ridden	  societies	   that	   embark	   on	   transitional	   justice	   processes.	   	   To	   the	  extent	   these	   institutions	   and	   practices	   may	   contribute	   to	   goals	  
	   69 See	  McDonald	  &	  Zatz,	  supra	  note	  31;	  Roth,	  supra	  note	  38;	  Reyntjens,	  supra	  note	  25,	  at	  195.	  70 Compare	   for	   example	   Latin	   American	   countries,	   such	   as	   Argentina,	   Uruguay,	  and	   Chile,	   and	   East	   European	   countries,	   such	   as	   Poland,	   the	   Czech	   republic	   and	  Hungary	   with	   Rwanda,	   Haiti	   and	   Nicaragua	   in	   UNDP,	   Human	   Development	   Report	  
2010,	   available	   at	  http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf.	  
22	   OREGON	  REVIEW	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	   [Vol.	  13,	  1	  such	   as	   security	   or	   nation	   building,	   transitional	   justice	   can	  certainly	  be	  important	  on	  its	  own.	  Very	  difficult	  questions	  of	  how	  to	  approach	  transitional	  justice	  in	  times	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  transition	  thus	  emerge,	  and	  more	  attention	  to	  these	  cases	  is	  required	  in	  theory.	  	  Two	  observations,	  however,	  seem	   to	   stand	   relatively	   clear.	   Firstly,	   dominant	   transitional	  justice	   discourses,	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   transitions	   from	  authoritarian	   rule	   to	   democracy,	   are	   often	   insufficient	   for	  understanding	   the	   intentions	   behind	   and	   the	   results	   of	  commencing	   processes	   of	   transitional	   justice	   in	   such	   cases.	  Secondly,	  non-­‐liberal	  transitions	  are	  very	  diverse,	  and	  much	  care	  is	  required	  when	  attempting	  to	  theorize	  about	  them.	  
II	  
TRANSITIONAL	  JUSTICE	  IN	  NON-­‐TRANSITIONS	  Instances	  where	  transitional	  justice	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  absence	  of	   a	   fundamental	   political	   transition,	   as	   the	   term	   “transitional	  justice”	   implies,	   have	   been	   less	   central	   in	   shaping	   the	   field	  compared	   to	   cases	   of	   transitional	   justice	   in	   transitions.	  	  Nonetheless,	   an	   institutionalized	   approach	   to	   dealing	   with	  massive	   human	   rights	   abuses	   can	   be	   found	   in	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  countries	  where	  we	  cannot	  speak	  of	  a	  “transition,”	  at	  least	  not	  in	  its	   usual	   meaning	   of	   a	   fundamental	   regime	   change.71	   	   The	  underlying	   interests	   of	   dealing	   with	   systematic	   abuses	   and	   the	  potential	   achievements	   of	   these	   processes	   in	   cases	   of	   non-­‐transition	  may	  differ	  radically	  from	  those	  interests	  and	  normative	  claims	   that	   are	   identified	   in	   influential	   studies	   of	   transitional	  justice.	   	   As	  with	   transitional	   justice	   in	   transitions,	   however,	   it	   is	  unrealistic	   to	   expect	   that	   cases	   of	   non-­‐transition	   can	   be	  approached	  from	  the	  same	  point	  of	  departure.	   	  At	   least,	   it	  seems	  required	   to	   make	   an	   overall	   distinction	   between	   transitional	  justice	   in	   cases	  of	   fragile	  and	  conflicted	   societies	  and	   in	   cases	  of	  consolidated	   and	   relatively	   peaceful	   democracies.	   	   Like	   the	  distinctions	   made	   above,	   this	   does	   not	   imply	   a	   dichotomy,	   but	  should	   rather	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   continuum	   where	   societies	   can	   be	  more	  or	  less	  internally	  peaceful	  and	  democratic.72	  	   71 The	  term	  “transition”	  has	  been	  explained	  as	  “the	  interval	  between	  one	  political	  regime	  and	  another,”	  where	  regime	  change	  refers	  to	  something	  more	  profound	  than,	  for	   example,	   the	  periodic	   changes	  of	   government	   in	   consolidated	  democracies.	   	  See	  GUILLERMO	  O’DONNELL	  &	  PHILIPPE	  C.	  SCHMITTER,	  TRANSITIONS	  FROM	  AUTHORITARIAN	  RULE:	  TENTATIVE	   CONCLUSIONS	   ABOUT	   UNCERTAIN	   DEMOCRACIES	   6	   (1986).	   	   The	   term	   “non-­‐transition,”	  as	  it	  is	  used	  here,	  should	  thus	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  profound	  political	   transition.	   	   Yet,	   the	   absence	   of	   this	   type	   of	   transition	   does	   not	   necessarily	  mean	   that	   there	   is	   no	   transition,	   for	   example,	   in	   terms	   of	  moving	   from	   large-­‐scale	  violent	  conflict	  to	  relative	  peace.	  72 The	   consolidation	   of	   democracy	   is	   said	   to	   depend	   on	   three	   dimensions:	   (1)	   a	  behavioral	   dimension	   that	   requires	   that	   no	   significant	   actors	   in	   society	   “spend	  significant	   resources	   attempting	   to	   achieve	   their	   objectives	   by	   creating	   a	   non	  democratic	  regime	  or	  turning	  to	  violence	  or	  foreign	  intervention	  to	  secede	  from	  the	  state,”	   (2)	   an	   attitudinal	   dimension	   that	   requires	   that	   a	   “strong	  majority	   of	   public	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A.	  	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Deeply	  Conflicted	  Societies	  Transitional	  justice	  in	  deeply	  conflicted	  societies	  that	  have	  not	  seen	   a	   fundamental	   regime	   change	   is	   not	   a	   subject	   that	   has	   had	  much	   influence	   on	   the	   forming	   of	   general	   theory.	   	   This	   neglect	  may	  in	  part	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  most	  of	  the	  instances	  where	   serious	   human	   rights	   abuses	   were	   dealt	   with	   in	   a	  systematic	  manner	   in	   the	  1980s	  and	  the	  early	  1990s—when	  the	  field	  was	   formed—the	  occurrence	  of	  such	  processes	  was	  related	  to	   a	  preceding	  political	   transition.73	   	   This,	   however,	   is	   no	   longer	  the	   case:	   truth	   commissions,	   criminal	   trials,	   and	  other	  measures	  normally	   considered	   processes	   of	   transitional	   justice	   when	  employed	   to	   deal	   with	   systematic	   human	   rights	   violations	   have	  been	   put	   in	   place	   in	   a	   number	   of	   fragile	   and	   deeply	   conflicted	  societies,	   where	   there	   has	   been	   no	   fundamental	   political	  transition,	   or	   where	   such	   a	   transformation	   remains	   highly	  disputed.74	   	   In	  a	  sense,	   transitional	   justice	  has	  moved	  forward	  in	  the	   sequencing	   of	   events.	   	   Yet,	   viewing	   the	   occurrence	   of	  transitional	  justice	  in	  these	  instances	  simply	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  change	  in	   sequencing	   is	   insufficient,	   and	   may	   in	   some	   cases	   even	   be	  wrong.	  Even	  among	  the	  cases	  brought	  to	  attention	  here,	   there	  appear	  to	   be	   two	   fundamentally	   different	   modes	   of	   how	   transitional	  justice	   can	   occur:	   one	   where	   the	   state	   itself,	   although	   to	   very	  different	   degrees	   in	   various	   cases,	   seems	   content	   with	  transitional	   justice,	   therefore	  making	  possible	   the	   establishment	  of	   processes	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   and	   one	   where	   the	   state	   is	  clearly	   opposed	   to	   transitional	   justice,	   causing	   measures	   to	  confront	  abuses	  to	  be	  deployed	  at	  other	  levels.	   	  However,	  as	  will	  be	  suggested	  in	  the	  following,	  these	  instances	  are	  not	  necessarily	  as	  radically	  different	  as	  they	  may	  initially	  appear.	  In	   Kenya,	   understanding	   the	   processes	   of	   transitional	   justice	  created	   following	   the	   2007–08	   election	   violence	   requires	   that	  attention	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  specific	  political	  context	  that	  surrounded	  the	  move	  towards	  a	   transitional	   justice	  solution	   for	  dealing	  with	  	  opinion	   believes	   that	   democratic	   procedures	   .	   .	   .	   are	   the	  most	   appropriate	   way	   of	  governing	  collective	  life	  in	  a	  society,”	  and	  (3)	  a	  constitutional	  dimension	  that	  requires	  that	   government	   as	   well	   as	   other	   actors	   are	   subjected	   and	   habituated	   to	   laws	  sanctioned	  by	   the	  democratic	   regime	   in	   solving	   their	  disputes.	   	   Put	  plainly	  by	   Juan	  Linz	  and	  Alfred	  Stepan,	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  democratic	  consolidation	  when	  democracy	  is	  the	  “only	  game	  in	  town.”	   	  See	   JUAN	  J.	  LINZ	  &	  ALFRED	  STEPAN,	  PROBLEMS	  OF	  DEMOCRATIC	  TRANSITION	   AND	   CONSOLIDATION:	   SOUTHERN	   EUROPE,	   SOUTH	   AMERICA,	   AND	   POST-­‐COMMUNIST	  EUROPE	  5–6	  (1996).	  73 See	   Ruti	   Teitel,	   Editorial	   Note—Transitional	   Justice	   Globalized,	   2	   INT’L	   J.	  TRANSITIONAL	   JUST.	   1,	   1	   (2008)	   (noting	   that	   “at	   that	   time	   [the	   late	   1980s	   and	   early	  1990s],	   transitional	   justice	   emerged	   from	   and	   came	   to	   be	   identified	   with	   a	   vital	  debate	  over	  whether	  to	  punish	  predecessor	  regimes,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  democracy	  and	  state-­‐building	  associated	  with	  the	  political	  transitions	  of	  that	  era”).	  74 See	  below	  in	  this	  section	  concerning	  the	  cases	  of	  Kenya,	  Colombia,	  Uganda,	  and	  Sudan.	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  The	  decision	  to	  embark	  on	  a	  path	  where	  legacies	  of	  political	   violence	   are	   to	  be	   confronted	  domestically	  by	  means	  of	  accountability,	   truth,	   and	   reform	  was	  made	   during	   the	   so-­‐called	  Kenyan	   National	   Dialogue	   and	   Reconciliation	   (“the	   Dialogue”),	  which	   aimed	   primarily	   at	   reaching	   a	   settlement	   on	   the	   political	  crisis	   that	   had	   sparked	   off	   the	   election	   violence.	   	   The	   Dialogue	  was	   facilitated	   by	   the	   African	   Union	   Panel	   of	   Eminent	  Personalities,	   headed	   by	   former	   UN	   Secretary-­‐General	   Kofi	  Annan,	  and	  followed	  closely	  by	  the	  international	  community,	  thus	  having	   clear	   international	   dimensions.75	   	   The	   two	  key	  parties	   to	  the	   dispute	   concerning	   election	   results	   which	   had	   been	   the	  trigger	   of	   political	   violence	   (the	   Party	   of	  National	   Unity,	   headed	  by	  incumbent	  President	  Mwai	  Kibaki,	  and	  the	  Orange	  Democratic	  Movement,	   headed	   by	   Raila	   Odinga)	   recognized	   that	   their	   final	  goal	   was	   the	   achievement	   of	   “sustainable	   peace,	   stability	   and	  justice	   in	   Kenya	   through	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   respect	   for	   human	  rights.”76	   	  The	  political	   settlement	  brought	  about	   the	   installation	  of	   a	   grand	   coalition	   government	   whereby	   both	   parties	   to	   the	  conflict	  obtained	  political	   influence,	  a	  measure	   that	  ended	   large-­‐scale	   political	   violence	   in	   the	   country.77	   	   The	   move	   towards	   a	  “transitional	   justice	   solution”	   to	   the	   election	   violence	  was	  made	  within	   this	   framework	   of	   solving	   a	   national	   political	   crisis.78	  	  Decisions	   to	   establish	   various	  measures	   to	   deal	  with	   legacies	   of	  political	   violence	   include	   the	   parties’	   agreement	   to	   ensure	  criminal	  accountability	  for	  the	  crimes,	  create	  a	  “Truth,	  Justice	  and	  Reconciliation	   Commission,”	   and	   commence	   a	   profound	   reform	  process	  that	  includes	  a	  constitutional	  review,	  institutional	  reform	  of	  such	  state	  institutions	  as	  the	  national	  police	  and	  the	  judiciary,	  as	  well	  as	  reforms	  targeting	  socio-­‐economic	  problems	  underlying	  the	  conflict,	  such	  as	  poverty	  and	  unfair	  land	  distribution.79	  For	   us	   to	   understand	   the	   dynamics	   of	   transitional	   justice	   in	  Kenya,	   it	   is	   vital	   to	   recall	   that	   these	   decisions	   were	   made	   in	   a	  	   75 See	   Interview	   with	   Kofi	   A.	   Annan	   (May	   9,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/JBRN-­‐7QM	  D4C-­‐full_report.pdf.	  76 	   KENYA	   NATIONAL	   DIALOGUE	   AND	   RECONCIALIATION,	   PUBLIC	   STATEMENT	   (2008),	  
available	   at	  http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/Public%20Statement%20from%20	  Dialogue%20Feb	  %201%20FINAL.pdf.	  77 KENYAN	   NATIONAL	   DIALOGUE	   AND	   RECONCILIATION,	   THE	   NATIONAL	   ACCORD	   AND	  RECONCILIATION	   ACT	   (2008),	   available	   at	   http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs	  /Signed_National_Accord_Act_Feb28.pdf.	  78 KENYA	   NATIONAL	   DIALOGUE	   AND	   RECONCILIATION,	   AGENDA	   ITEM	   THREE:	   HOW	   TO	  RESOLVE	   THE	   POLITICAL	   CRISIS	   (2008),	   available	   at	   http://www.dialoguekenya.org	  /docs/14_Feb_08_TsavoAgreement.pdf;	   KENYAN	   NATIONAL	   DIALOGUE	   AND	  RECONCILIATION,	   ON	   THE	   RESOLUTION	   OF	   THE	   POLITICAL	   CRISIS	   (2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/Signed_Annotated_Agenda_Feb1st.pdf;	   KENYA	  NATIONAL	  DIALOGUE	  AND	  RECONCILIATION,	  STATEMENT	  OF	  PRINCIPLES	  ON	  LONG-­‐TERM	  ISSUES	  AND	   SOLUTIONS	   (2008),	   available	   at	   http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs	   /S_of_P	  _with_Matrix.pdf.	  79 Id.	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  context	   where	   those	   who	   maintained	   and	   obtained	   political	  power	  through	  the	  political	  settlement	  include	  some	  of	  the	  same	  politicians	  who	  allegedly	  had	  incited,	  or	  in	  other	  ways	  supported,	  the	  very	  violence	  that	  these	  processes	  are	  meant	  to	  confront.80	  	  It	  is	  also	  necessary	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  some	  politicians	  benefit,	  or	  seemingly	   think	  that	   they	  benefit,	   from	  maintaining	  a	  status	  quo	  of	   governance,	   and	   that	   contrary	   to	   mainstream	   perceptions,	  large-­‐scale	   violence	   in	   Kenya	   has	   in	   fact	   surrounded	   most	  significant	  political	  activity	   in	   this	  country	  since	   independence.81	  	  Given	   this,	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   some	   key	   stakeholders	   in	  Kenyan	   transitional	   justice	   appear	   to	   have	   an	   ambiguous	   stand	  toward	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  processes	  should	  really	  confront	  the	   causes	  of	  political	   violence	  and	   include	  accountability	   for	   its	  perpetrators.	   	  Many	   politicians	   seem	   to	   have	   had	   a	   half-­‐hearted	  commitment	   to	   implementing	   the	   legal	  and	   institutional	  reforms	  that	   were	   initially	   agreed	   upon.82	   	   Likewise,	   the	   ambitions	   to	  prosecute	  perpetrators	  of	  political	  violence	  in	  Kenyan	  courtrooms	  were	  rejected	  by	  Parliament,	  which	  voted	  down	  a	  proposed	  bill	  in	  2009.83	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  some	  parliamentarians	  said	  they	  feared	  that	  fair	  justice	  would	  not	  be	  delivered	  in	  Kenya,	  while	  others	  implied	  that	  pursuing	  criminal	  justice	  in	  the	  Kenyan	  context	  runs	  counter	  to	  efforts	  of	  reconciling	  groups	  and	   individuals,	   though	  the	  main	  reason	  seems	   to	  be	   that	   large	  parts	  of	   the	  political	   leadership	   in	  Kenya	   simply	   remain	  opposed	   to	  accountability	   for	   the	  electoral	  violence.84	   	   These	   challenges	   to	   criminal	   accountability	  must	   be	  	   80 See	  Comm’n	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  Post	  Election	  Violence,	  Report	  of	  the	  Commission	  of	  
Inquiry	   into	   Post	   Election	   Violence,	   20–36	   (2008),	  http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs	  /PEV%20Report.pdf	   [hereinafter	  PEV	  Inquiry];	  Prosecutor’s	   Application	   Pursuant	   to	   Article	   58	   as	   to	  William	   Samoei	   Ruto,	   Henry	  Kiprono	   Kosgey	   and	   Joshua	   Arap	   Sang,	   Public	   Redacted	   Version	   of	   Document	   ICC-­‐01/09-­‐30-­‐Conf-­‐Exp,	   Dec.	   15,	   2010,	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc985613.pdf;	  Prosecutor’s	  Application	  Pursuant	   to	  Article	  58	  as	   to	  Francis	  Kirimi	  Muthaura,	  Uhuru	  Muigai	  Kenyatta	  and	  Mohammed	  Hussein	  Ali,	  Public	   Redacted	   Version	   of	   document	   ICC-­‐01/09-­‐31-­‐Conf-­‐Exp,	   Dec.	   15,	   2010,	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc985621.pdf.	  81 See	  PEV	  Inquiry,	  supra	  note	  80,	  at	  20–36.	  82 A	   new	   constitution,	   which	   significantly	   changes	   the	   governance	   system,	   was	  adopted	  in	  August	  2010.	  	  See	  Thomas	  Obel	  Hansen	  Will	  the	  New	  Constitution	  Lead	  to	  a	  
More	   Peaceful	   Kenya?,	   African	   Arguments	   (Royal	   African	   Society	   &	   Social	   Science	  
Research	   Council),	   Aug.	   4,	   2010,	   available	   at	  http://africanarguments.org/2010/08/will-­‐the-­‐new-­‐constitution-­‐lead-­‐to-­‐a-­‐more-­‐peaceful-­‐kenya/.	  	  However,	  the	  implementation	  process	  has	  been	  slow,	  largely	  due	  to	  power	   struggles	   in	   Kenya’s	   political	   leadership,	   many	   of	   which	   indicate	   that	  politicians	  continue	  to	  put	  their	  personal	  interests	  over	  the	  reform	  agenda.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Anthony	   Kariuki,	   Kibaki	   Withdraws	   List	   of	   Nominees,	   PM	   Welcomes	   Move,	   DAILY	  NATION,	   Feb.	   22,	   2011,	   available	   at	   http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-­‐/1064	  /1112564/-­‐/7oxru4/-­‐/index.html.	  83 See,	   e.g.,	   Charles	  Wanyoro	   &	   Philip	   Muyanga,	  Ocampo	   Set	   to	   Take	   over	   Chaos	  
Trials,	   DAILY	  NATION,	   (Aug.	   30,	   2009),	  available	   at	  http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-­‐/1056/648008/-­‐/um9prf/-­‐/index.html.	  84 See	  Thomas	  Obel	  Hansen,	  Why	   the	  Ocampo	  Six	  Should	  Not	  Become	  Kenya’s	  Six,	  (Feb.	   14,	   2011),	   available	   at	   http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-­‐obel-­‐hansen/why-­‐ocampo-­‐six-­‐should-­‐not-­‐become-­‐kenya%E2%80%99s-­‐six.	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  1	  understood	  in	  light	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  of	  those	  who	  are	  to	  adopt	  such	   measures	   are	   among	   those	   suspected	   for	   organizing	   the	  violence,	   a	   scenario	   that	   is	   obviously	  quite	  different	   from	  a	  new	  democracy’s	  commitment	  to	  prosecute	  authoritarian	  leaders	  who	  no	  longer	  hold	  office.85	  However,	   to	   understand	   transitional	   justice	   in	   Kenya,	   it	   is	  indispensable	   to	   look	   beyond	   the	   interests	   of	   national	   political	  leaders.	  	  First,	  it	  must	  be	  recalled	  that	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  Dialogue	  were	   not	   only	   under	   a	   heavy	   pressure,	   both	   from	   local	   civil	  society	  and	  international	  actors,	  to	  find	  a	  political	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis	  that	  had	  sparked	  off	  the	  violence,	  they	  were—and	  are—also	  under	   heavy	   pressure	   to	   obtain	   justice	   for	   the	   victims,	   ensure	  accountability,	   reconcile	   the	   nation,	   and	   transform	   those	  institutions	   and	   structures	   that	   observers	   pointed	   to	   as	  underlying	   causes	  of	   the	   violence.86	   	   Second,	   and	   related	  hereto,	  there	   is	   an	   interesting	   interaction	   between	   international	   justice	  and	  justice	  at	  the	  national	  level	  in	  Kenya	  that	  deserves	  attention.	  	  The	   “Waki	  Commission,”	  which	  was	   set	   up	  by	   the	  parties	   to	   the	  Dialogue,	  was	  granted	  the	  powers	  to	  investigate	  the	  violence	  and	  put	   forward	   recommendations	   for	   how	   to	   deal	   with	   it.87	   	   The	  commission’s	  report	  highlighted	  decades	  of	  impunity	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  the	   election	   violence,	   and	   therefore	   recommended	   the	  establishment	  of	  Special	  Tribunals,	  with	  a	  judicial	  staff	  made	  up	  of	  both	   Kenyans	   and	   foreigners,	   to	   acquire	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	  election	  violence.88	   	  The	  Waki	  Commission	  requested	   the	  parties	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  such	  tribunals	  and	  put	   forward	  a	  bill	   in	  Parliament.89	   	  The	  request	  was	  made	  under	  the	   threat	   that	   failure	   to	  comply	  with	   this	  within	  a	   timeframe	  of	  sixty	  days	  after	   the	  commission’s	  report	  was	  made	  public	  would	  result	   in	   a	   list	   of	   names	   with	   high-­‐profile	   Kenyans	   that	   the	  commission	   suspected	   responsible	   for	   the	   violence	   would	   be	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  prosecutor	  of	  the	  ICC.90	  	  Since	  Kenya	  failed	  to	  act,	   on	   July	   9,	   2009,	   Kofi	   Annan	   handed	   the	   list	   over	   to	   the	   ICC	  prosecutor,	   who,	   after	   receiving	   authorization	   from	   Pre-­‐Trial	  Chamber	  II	  of	  the	  Court,	  commenced	  his	  investigations.91	  When	  in	  	   85 Id.	  86 See,	   e.g.,	   Anthony	   Kariuki,	  New	   U.S.	   Sanctions	   Target	   15	   Kenya	   Leaders,	   DAILY	  NATION	   (Sept.	   24,	   2009),	   available	   at	   http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-­‐/1056/662848/-­‐/undt18/-­‐/index.html;	   Macharia	   Gaitho,	   Envoy	   Pushed	   for	   Regime	  
Change	   to	   Avert	   Crisis	   in	   2012,	   DAILY	   NATION	   (Dec.	   9,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Envoy+pushed+for+regime+change+to+avert+crisis+in+2012+/-­‐/1064/1069508	  /-­‐/vanrw8/-­‐/index.html.	  87 See	   PEV	   INQUIRY,	   supra	   note	   80	   (presenting	   the	   commission’s	   500-­‐plus	   page	  report,	   which	   is	   generally	   believed	   to	   comprise	   a	   thorough	   and	   impartial	  investigation	  of	  the	  election	  violence	  and	  its	  underlying	  causes).	  88 Id.	  at	  472–75.	  89 Id.	  90 Id.	  91 See,	  e.g.,	  Bernard	  Namunane,	  Six	  to	  be	  Tried	  at	  the	  Hague,	  DAILY	  NATION,	  May	  10,	  2010,	   available	   at	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   27	  December	  2010,	  Ocampo	  named	  six	  key	  suspects	  of	  the	  electoral	  violence—including	   the	   former	   police	   chief,	   the	   head	   of	   civil	  service	  and	  three	  prominent	  politicians,	  of	  whom	  two	  have	  made	  clear	   they	   intend	   to	   run	   for	  president	   in	  2012—this	  caused	  new	  turmoil	   in	   Kenyan	   politics.92	   	   A	   number	   of	   strategies	   have	   been	  employed	  to	  avoid	  ICC	  prosecutions,	  including	  a	  motion	  passed	  by	  parliament	   putting	   pressure	   on	   the	   executive	   to	  withdraw	   from	  the	  Rome	  Statute,	  diplomatic	  pressure	  for	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  to	   defer	   the	   Kenyan	   ICC	   cases	   and	   renewed	   attention	   to	   the	  judicial	  reforms,	  believed	  to	  make	  such	  a	  deferral	  more	  likely.93	  The	   Kenyan	   case	   highlights	   how	   understanding	   transitional	  justice	  in	  cases	  where	  there	  has	  been	  no	  profound	  regime	  shift—or	   where	   at	   least	   the	   form	   of	   transition	   is	   very	   different	   from	  transitions	  to	  democracy—can	  require	  us	  to	  think	  in	  other	  terms	  about	   the	   actors	   and	   interests	   than	   in	   cases	   of	   democratic	  transitions.	   	   Those	  who	   support	   transitional	   justice	  may	   include	  local	   civil	   society;	   international	   NGOs,	   such	   as	   the	   International	  Center	   for	   Transitional	   Justice	   and	   human	   rights	   organizations	  such	   as	   Amnesty	   International;	   fractions	   within	   the	   incumbent	  regime;	   the	   “international	   community”,	   including	   UN	   agencies,	  international	  brokers	  of	  peace	  agreements,	  or	  groups	  of	  powerful	  states;	  particular	  international	  legal	  institutions,	  in	  particular	  the	  ICC;	   or,	   more	   reasonably	   considered,	   a	   combination	   thereof.	  	  Those	  who	  oppose	  dealing	  comprehensively	  with	  past	  violations	  by	  means	  of	  truth,	  accountability,	  compensation,	  and	  reform	  may	  still	  hold	  high	  political	  office	  or	  continue	  to	  serve	  as	  high-­‐ranking	  civil	   servants.	   	   Thinking	   about	   transitional	   justice	   as	   a	   project	  pursued	   by	   new	   democratic	   leaders	   because	   it	   will	   consolidate	  liberal	  ideas	  is	  not	  a	  suitable	  model	  for	  understanding	  a	  case	  like	  the	  Kenyan.	  	  Rather,	  attention	  to	  the	  compromises	  brought	  about	  by	  international	  involvement	  in	  peace	  talks	  and	  justice	  processes	  and	   the	   continued	   influence	   of	   political	   elites	   responsible	   for	  orchestrating	   mass	   violence,	   along	   with	   below-­‐the-­‐state	   level	  advocacy	  for	  dealing	  with	  abuses,	  seems	  vital	  for	  comprehending	  difficult	  questions	  of	  what	  it	  is	  that	  transitional	  justice	  is	  intended	  to—and	   can—achieve	   in	   such	   contexts.	   	   It	   is	   certainly	   highly	  relevant	   to	   ask	   the	   question	   of	   how	   transitional	   justice	   in	   this	  kind	   of	   a	   scenario	   may	   transform	   governance,	   for	   example	   by	  means	   of	   accountability	   and	   institutional	   reform.	   	   At	   the	   same	  time,	   it	   must	   be	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   profound	  political	   transition	   imposes	   constraints	   on	   transitional	   justice	   in	  ways	   that	   are	   largely	   unfamiliar	   to	   democratic	   transitions.94	  	  	  http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Six%20to%20be%20tried%20at%20The%20Hague%20/-­‐/1064/916028/-­‐/8fpj3ez/-­‐/index.html.	  92 See	  Obel	  Hansen,	  supra	  note	  84.	  93 Id.	  94 See,	  e.g.,	  ELSTER	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  188–215	  (discussing	  constraints	  on	  transitional	  justice	  in	  democratic	  transitions).	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   the	   success	   of	   a	   case	   like	   the	   Kenyan	   depends	   most	  crucially	   on	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   decision-­‐makers	   commence	  processes	   that	   can	   transform	   the	   system	   of	   governance	   so	   that	  risks	   of	   “‘winner-­‐takes-­‐it-­‐all	   calculus’”	   decrease	   and	   so	   that	  accountability	   becomes	   a	   likely	   outcome	   of	   any	   future	  endorsement	  of	  political	   violence.	   	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   criteria	   for	  success	  include	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  socioeconomic	  structures	  are	  changed.	   	  Questions	  of	   land	  distribution,	   for	   instance,	   are	  highly	  relevant	   in	   the	   Kenyan	   context	   because	   they	   provide	   fertile	  ground	  for	  inter-­‐community	  grievances,	  which	  have	  been	  triggers	  of	   political	   violence	   in	   the	   country	   since	   independence.95	   	   One	  practical	   implication	   of	   these	   observations	   is	   that	   we	   must	  acknowledge	  a	  very	  sensitive	  balance.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  external	  and	   internal	   pressure	   on	   decision-­‐makers	   to	   implement	   the	  transformation	   that	   they	   agreed	   to	   in	   a	   context	   of	   a	   political	  settlement	   is	   vital	   for	   such	   change	   to	   actually	   occur	   in	   any	  meaningful	   way.	   	   Where	   imposing	   transitional	   justice—notably	  by	   trying	   perpetrators	   in	   The	   Hague—may	   prove	   the	   only	  solution	   for	   achieving	   accountability	   and	   deter	   members	   of	   the	  political	  elite	  from	  again	  organizing	  mass	  violence,	  that	  is,	  on	  the	  other	   hand,	   also	   insufficient	   for	   achieving	   the	   needed	  transformation.	  In	  Colombia,	  a	  transitional	  justice	  process	  launched	  in	  2005	  has	  led	   to	   intense	   debate	   on	   the	   value	   of	   this	   endeavor.96	   	   Some	  scholars	   argue	   that	   these	   attempts	   equal	   “a	   flawed	   process	   of	  paramilitary	  disarmament”	  that	  has	  “arguably	  not	  been	  about	  the	  widening,	   deepening	   or	   strengthening	   of	   democracy	   in	   the	  country.”97	   	   Others	   look	  more	   positively	   at	   what	   they	   see	   as	   an	  integration	   of	   the	   transitional	   justice	   paradigm	   in	   processes	   of	  disarmament,	  demobilization,	  and	  reintegration	  (DDR	  programs),	  which	  offers	  hope,	  they	  suggest,	   for	  achieving	  truth,	  redress,	  and	  accountability	  in	  a	  context	  that	  has	  usually	  been	  approached	  from	  a	   security	   perspective,	   rather	   than	   a	   justice	   and	   reconciliation	  perspective.98	  The	  debate	  concerns	  a	  2005	  bill,	   “The	  Peace	  and	  Justice	  Law,”	  which	   was	  modified	   following	   a	   constitutional	   court	   ruling	   that	  declared	   several	   provisions	   unconstitutional.	   	   The	   law	   was	  enacted	   in	   the	   context	   of	   an	   already	   existing	   law	   on	  
	   95 See	   Thomas	   Obel	   Hansen,	   Political	   Violence	   in	   Kenya:	   A	   Study	   of	   Causes,	  
Responses,	   and	   a	   Framework	   for	   Discussing	   Preventive	   Action,	   Iss	   Paper	   No.	   205	  (2009),	  http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/p205.PDF.	  96 See	  Catalina	  Diaz,	  Challenging	  Impunity	  from	  Below:	  The	  Contested	  Ownership	  of	  
Transitional	   Justice	   in	   Colombia,	   in	   TRANSITIONAL	   JUSTICE	   FROM	   BELOW:	   GRASSROOTS	  ACTIVISM	  AND	  THE	  STRUGGLE	  FOR	  CHANGE	  189	  (Kieran	  McEvoy	  &	  Lorna	  McGregor	  eds.,	  2008).	  97 Id.,	  at	  196.	  98 See,	   e.g.,	   Lisa	   J.	   Laplante	   &	   Kimberly	   Theidon,	   Transitional	   Justice	   in	   Times	   of	  
Conflict:	  Colombia’s	  Ley	  de	  Justicia	  y	  Paz,	  28	  MICH.	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  49	  (2006).	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  demobilization	   of	   combatants.99	   	   The	   Peace	   and	   Justice	   Law	  establishes	  a	  National	  Reparation	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission;	  a	   National	   Reparation	   Fund;	   and,	   after	   hard	   critique,	   both	   from	  Colombian	   civil	   society	   and	   international	   observers	   of	   the	  government’s	   proposal	   for	   blanket	   amnesties,	   facilitates	   that	  perpetrators	   can	   face	   criminal	   justice	   for	   gross	   human	   rights	  violations,	   though	  with	   provisions	   for	   very	   lenient	   sentences.100	  	  Decision-­‐makers’	   interest	   in	   doing	   justice	   for	   serious	   abuses	   in	  this	  context	  of	  demobilization,	  some	  commentators	  suggest,	  may	  translate	   into	   creating	   perceptions	   that	   the	   government	   is	  attentive	  to	  victims’	  needs	  and	  pursues	  progressive	  change,	  while	  in	   reality	   attempting	   to	   avoid	   more	   thorough	   reforms	   of	  governance	   and	   only	   marginally	   benefitting	   the	   needs	   of	  victims.101	  	  However,	  as	  in	  Kenya,	  the	  turn	  to	  justice	  for	  (some	  of)	  the	   abuses	   committed	   during	   the	   Colombian	   civil	   war	   must	   be	  looked	  at	  in	  a	  context	  where	  important	  parts	  of	  the	  international	  community	   have	   become	   significantly	   more	   opposed	   to	   blanket	  amnesties.	   	  Most	   importantly	   perhaps,	  we	   should	   recall	   that	   the	  existence	   of	   the	   ICC—and	   the	   prosecutor	   continuously	   implying	  that	  he	  is	  “keeping	  an	  eye	  on	  Colombia”102—appears	  to	  have	  had	  significant	   influence	   on	   the	   shaping	   of	   domestic	   responses	   to	  accountability.103	  The	   National	   Reconciliation	   and	   Reparation	   Commission	   is	  now	  up	  running	  and	  has	  investigated	  some	  cases	  of	  gross	  human	  rights	  violations,	  and	  more	  than	  30,000	  paramilitaries	  have	  been	  demobilized.104	  	  Though	  only	  few	  have	  been	  convicted	  for	  serious	  crimes	  under	   the	   law,	   a	  number	  of	   ex-­‐combatants	   are	  providing	  information	   to	   prosecutors,	   and	   investigations	   of	   high-­‐ranking	  officials	  and	  members	  of	  parliament	  are	  commencing,	  partly	  as	  a	  result	   of	   the	   information	   provided	   by	   these	   ex-­‐combatants.105	  	  Still,	   members	   of	   the	   Uribe	   administration	   are	   accused	   of	  maintaining	  ties	  with	  the	  paramilitaries,	  and	  Uribe	  is	  criticized	  for	  	   99 See	  id.	  (describing	  in	  detail	  the	  demobilization	  law).	  100 See,	  e.g.,	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  COLOMBIA:	  TOWARDS	  PEACE	  AND	  JUSTICE	  8–14	  (2006)	  http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/icg/Colombia14Mar06.pdf.	  101 See,	  e.g.,	  Diaz,	  supra	  note	  96.	  102 The	  American	  Non-­‐Governmental	  Organizations	  Coalition	  for	  the	  International	  Criminal	   Court,	   An	   ICC	   Investigation	   of	   Colombia?,	   (Aug.	   11,	   2005),	   available	   at	  http://www.amicc.org/docs/Colombia.pdf.	  103 See,	  e.g.,	  Maria	  José	  Guembe	  &	  Helena	  Olea,	  No	  Justice,	  No	  Peace:	  Discussion	  of	  a	  
Legal	   Framework	   Regarding	   the	   Demobilization	   of	   Non-­‐State	   Armed	   Groups	   in	  
Colombia,	   TRANSITIONAL	   JUSTICE	   IN	   THE	  TWENTY-­‐FIRST	  CENTURY:	  BEYOND	  TRUTH	  VERSUS	  JUSTICE,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at,	  137	  (”The	  JPL	  [the	  Justice	  and	  Peace	  Law]	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  conceived	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  try	  to	  avoid	  triggering	  ICC’s	  jurisdiction”).	  104 See,	   e.g.,	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   WATCH,	   Breaking	   the	   Grip?	   Obstacle	   to	   Justice	   For	  
Paramilitary	   Mafias	   in	   Colombia	   (2008)	   [HEREINAFTER	   Breaking	   The	   Grip?],	  http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/10/16/breaking-­‐grip;	  Semana	  International,	  
Justice	  and	  Peace	  Law	  .	  .	  .	  Four	  Years	  Later	  (2009),	  http://www.semana.com/noticias	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐international/justice-­‐and-­‐peacelawfour-­‐years-­‐later/126742.aspx.	  105 Id.	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  failing	   to	   launch	   more	   thorough	   reforms	   of	   governance	   which	  could	  circumvent	  democratic	  deficits	  and	  serious	  problems	  in	  the	  executive’s	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  while	  also	  potentially	  help	  to	  facilitate	  the	  cease	  of	  large-­‐scale	  conflict	  by	  bringing	  to	  an	  end	  the	  decade-­‐long	   civil	   war	   with	   left-­‐wing	   guerrillas	   (FARC	   and	  others).106	  Referring	   to	   the	  Colombian	  efforts	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   “transitional	  justice”	   illustrates	  the	  power	  of	   the	  transitional	   justice	  paradigm	  and	   calls	   into	   question	   the	   accuracy	   in	   describing	   the	   process	  primarily	   as	   a	   question	   of	   “justice.”	   	   Turned	   around,	   the	  Colombian	  case	  may	  be	  said	  to	  illustrate	  how	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  achieve	   some	  kind	  of	   justice	  while	  attempting	   to	   limit	   violent	  conflict.	   	   This	   also	   suggests	   that	   this	   case	   cannot	   easily	   be	  evaluated	  according	  to	  the	  same	  standards	  as	  used	  in	  contexts	  of	  ended	   conflict	   or	   ended	   regime	   oppression.	   	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  much	   more	   than	   decision-­‐makers	   are	   attempting	   to	   achieve	  liberalization	   and	   governance	   reform,	   transitional	   justice	   in	  Colombia	   provides	   central	   actors	   with	   a	   tool	   for	   controlling	   an	  ongoing	  conflict	  and	  maintaining	  status	  quo	  in	  governance.107	  	  On	  the	   other	   hand,	   the	   setting	   up	   of	   a	   legal	   framework	   for	  accountability	   for	   paramilitaries	   shows	   how	   transitional	   justice	  can	  have	   its	  own	  dynamics	  and	  how	  some	  amount	  of	   justice	  can	  actually	  be	  achieved	  despite	  the	  process	  focusing	  on	  still	  powerful	  entities	   and	   taking	   place	   in	   a	   period	   where	   there	   has	   been	   no	  completed	  transition,	  political	  or	  otherwise.108	  Approaching	   transitional	   justice	   in	   times	   of	   conflict	   may	  require	  that	  expectations	  of	  liberal	  change	  are	  adjusted,	  at	  least	  as	  long	  as	  the	  very	  stakeholders	  subjected	  to	  accountability	  maintain	  influence	   and	   power.	   	   Of	   course,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	  transitional	   justice	   in	   cases	   such	   as	   Colombia	   should	   not	   be	  carefully	  scrutinized	  and	  that	  we	  should	  not	  point	  to	  flaws	  in	  the	  process.	   	   But	   it	   suggests	   that	   it	  may	   be	   too	  much	   to	   expect	   that	  besides	   providing	   some	   amount	   of	   accountability,	   truth,	   and	  redress	   for	   victims,	   transitional	   justice	   should	   have	   significant	  potential	   for	   facilitating	  a	   transformation	  of	   governance,	   at	   least	  in	  the	  short-­‐term.	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  out	  to	  implicate	  parliamentarians	  and	  cabinet	  members,	  see,	  e.g.,	  BREAKING	  THE	  GRIP?,	  supra	  note	  104.	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  In	  Uganda,	  the	  commencement	  of	  a	  transitional	  justice	  process	  to	  deal	  with	  violations	  committed	  during	  the	  conflict	  in	  northern	  parts	   of	   the	   country	   presents	   an	   interesting	   example	   of	   how	  different	   interests	   can	   intertwine.	   	   Some	   observers	   imply	   that	  when	  in	  2003	  President	  Museveni	  referred	  crimes	  committed	  by	  the	   LRA	   in	   northern	   Uganda	   to	   the	   ICC,	   this	   move	   should	   be	  viewed	   as	   one	   weapon	   in	   the	   arsenal	   in	   fighting	   the	   still	   active	  rebels.109	   	   While	   the	   ICC	   issuing	   arrest	   warrants	   against	   LRA	  leaders	   in	   2005	   was	   celebrated	   by	   many	   commentators,	   the	  Court’s	   failure	   to	   investigate	   Ugandan	   army	   atrocities	   has	   been	  criticized	   as	   an	   example	   of	   selective	   justice.110	   	   However,	   when	  peace	   talks	   with	   the	   LRA	   appeared	   to	   stand	   a	   real	   chance	   of	  success,	   and	   the	   rebels	   unsurprisingly	   made	   clear	   that	   they	  perceived	  the	  arrest	  warrants	  as	   the	  key	  obstacle	   to	  reaching	  an	  agreement,111	   new	   developments	   took	   place.	   	  With	   reference	   to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Ugandan	  government	  and	  the	  LRA	  had	  decided	  to	  deal	   with	   issues	   of	   transitional	   justice	   in	   Uganda,	   Museveni	  attempted	  to	  convince	  the	  ICC	  that	  it	  should	  drop	  charges	  against	  LRA	   leaders,	   an	   idea	   that	   the	   Court	   has	   so	   far	   rejected.112	   	   The	  arrangement,	   known	   as	   the	   Juba	   Agreement,	   sets	   up	   “Special	  Tribunals”	   to	   hear	   the	   most	   grave	   cases	   (with	   provisions	   for	  “alternative	   sentences”),	   while	   referring	   the	   rest	   to	   “alternative	  justice	   mechanisms”	   that	   rely	   on	   so-­‐called	   traditional	   justice.113	  	  The	   Juba	   Agreement	   also	   stipulates	   that	   a	   reparation	   fund	   to	  victims	  must	  be	  set	  up.114	   	  The	  Ugandan	  “Justice,	  Law	  and	  Order	  Sector”	  has	  been	  charged	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  implementing	  these	   decisions.115	   	   It	   has	   engaged	   in	   consultations	   with	   civil	  
	   109 Compare,	  e.g.,	  The	  Refugee	  Law	  Project,	   ICC	  Statement	  4	  (2004),	  http://www	  .refugeelawproject.org/archive/2004/RLP.ICC.investig.pdf	   (noting	   that	   “by	  November	  2003,	  Museveni	  had	  seemingly	   lost	   the	  diplomatic	  battle	  on	   the	  military	  solution	   to	   the	   LRA.	   	   To	   regain	   lost	   ground	   and	   to	   re-­‐assert	   his	   democratic	  credentials,	  he	  took	  a	  number	  of	  actions	  [including	  ICC	  referral]	   in	  rapid	  succession	  which	  served	  to	  obfuscate	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  war	  in	  northern	  Uganda,	  which	  was	  now	  gaining	  momentum”),	  with	  Phil	  Clark,	  If	  Ocampo	  Indicts	  Bashir,	  Nothing	  May	  Happen,	  (July	   13,	   2008)	   (unpublished	   manuscript)	   available	   at	  http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Clark_Final.pdf	   (implying	   that	   the	   ICC	   itself	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  convincing	  the	  Ugandan	  leaders	  to	  make	  the	  referral).	  110 See,	   e.g.,	   ICC	   Takes	   Decisive	   Step	   for	   Justice	   in	   Uganda,	   HRW.ORG,	   http://www	  .hrw.org/node/70189.	  (last	  visited	  Feb.	  8,	  2011).	  111 See	   H.	   Abigail	   Moi,	   The	   International	   Criminal	   Court’s	   Arrest	   Warrants	   and	  
Uganda’s	   Lord’s	   resistance	   Army:	   Renewing	   the	   Debate	   over	   Amnesty	   and	  
Complementarity,	   19	   HARV.	   HUM.	   RTS.	   J.	   267	   (2006)	   (discussing	   ICC	   actions	   and	  responses	  in	  Uganda	  from	  the	  political	  leadership	  and	  the	  LRA).	  112 Id.	  113 See	  Agreement	  On	  Accountability	   and	  Reconciliation,	  Uganda-­‐Sudan,	   June	  29,	  2007,	  http://www.beyondjuba.org/peace_agreements/Agreement_on_Accountability	  _And_Reconcilition.pdf.	  114 Id.	   (Making	   clear	   reference	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   complementarity	   as	   a	   guiding	  principle	  of	  the	  ICC).	  115 See	  Beyond	  Juba,	  Tradition	  in	  Transition:	  Drawing	  on	  the	  Old	  to	  Develop	  a	  New	  
Jurisprudence	  for	  Dealing	  with	  Uganda’s	  Legacy	  of	  Violence	  (Working	  Paper	  No.	  1,	  July	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  and	  has	   facilitated	   the	  setting	  up	  of	  a	   special	  war	  crimes	  division	  of	   the	  High	  Court,	  which	   is	   to	   try	   the	  most	   serious	  LRA	  offences.116	   	   Yet,	   while	   communities	   in	   northern	   Uganda	   are	  utilizing	   “traditional	   practices”	   to	   reintegrate	   and	   reconcile,	   ICC	  arrest	  warrants	  are	  still	  valid;	  the	  war	  crimes	  division	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  has	  yet	  to	  put	  on	  trial	  the	  first	  LRA	  leader;	  Joseph	  Kony,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  LRA,	  has	  failed	  to	  sign	  the	  final	  peace	  accord,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  LRA	  atrocities	  continue	  to	  occur	   in	  the	  DRC,	   the	  Central	  African	  Republic,	  and	  Southern	  Sudan.117	  The	   Ugandan	   case	   thus	   highlights	   how	   the	   interests	   behind	  establishing	   processes	   of	   transitional	   justice	   in	   still	   deeply	  conflicted	   societies	   with	   no	   regime	   change—much	   more	   than	  aiming	   at	   reforming	   governance—can	   be	   a	   “tool	   in	   the	   toolbox”	  for	   leaders	  to	  control	  conflict.	   	  But	   it	  also	   illustrates	   that	  serving	  these	   objectives	   can	   take	   place	   simultaneously	   with	   efforts	   to	  provide	   victims	   with	   some	   amount	   of	   redress.	   	   In	   a	   sense,	   the	  Ugandan	  case	  highlights	  how	  transitional	  justice	  has	  become	  both	  
internationalized	  (the	  ICC’s	  arrest	  warrants	  and	  their	  complicated	  connection	   to	   transitional	   justice	   in	  Uganda,	   international	   actors	  pushing	   for	   justice	   in	   Uganda,	   and	   a	   regional	   dimension	   of	   the	  atrocities	   which	   must	   be	   addressed)	   and	   localized	   (the	   opt	   for	  using	   so-­‐called	   “traditional	   practices”	   in	   local	   communities	   and	  the	   influence	   of	   Ugandan	   civil	   society	   in	   shaping	   transitional	  justice	   policies).	   	   Understanding	   transitional	   justice	   in	   Uganda	  requires	   that	   attention	   be	   paid	   to	   how	   these	   levels	   intertwine.	  	  Finally,	  the	  case	  exemplifies	  how	  appreciating	  transitional	  justice	  may	   require	   the	   observer	   to	   integrate	   an	   interpretation	   of	   a	  variety	   of	   goals,	   such	   as	   peace,	   reconciliation,	   victims’	   healing,	  justice	   in	   different	   forms,	   and	   governance	   reform.	   	   Any	  meaningful	   appraisal	   must	   depart	   from	   the	   perception	   that	  transitional	   justice	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   leaders	   at	   the	   state	   level	  attempting	   to	   “do	   good,”	   while	   having	   to	   overcome	   obstacles	  imposed	   by	   other	   stakeholders.	   	   This	   is	   highlighted	   by	   the	   fact	  that	   the	   Ugandan	   government	   itself	   is	   responsible	   for	   gross	  human	   rights	   violations,	   and	   because	   the	   conflict	   in	   northern	  Uganda	   must	   be	   understood	   in	   light	   of	   a	   “north-­‐south”	   divide,	  where	   the	   current	   administration	   is	   accused	   of	   discriminating	  against	   northerners,	   thus	   leading	   to	   widespread	   dissatisfaction	  
	  2009)	   http://www.beyondjuba.org/working_papers/BJP.WP1.pdf	   (discussing	   the	  use	  of	  so-­‐called	  traditional	  practices).	  116 Id.	  117 See	   generally	   Moi,	   supra	   note	   111;	   Beyond	   Juba	   Project,	   supra	   note	   115	  (discussing	   the	   use	   of	   so-­‐called	   traditional	   practices);	   INTERNATIONAL	   CRISIS	   GROUP,	  NORTHERN	   UGANDA:	   UNDERSTANDING	   AND	   SOLVING	   THE	   CONFLICT	   (2004),	  http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-­‐of-­‐africa/uganda/Northern	  %20Uganda%20Understanding%20and%20Solving%20the%20Conflict.ashx	  (analyzing	   LRA	   atrocities	   and	   discussing	   appropriate	   responses	   for	   solving	   the	  conflict).	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  with	   the	  government	  among	  certain	  groups,	   such	  as	   the	  Acholis,	  and	  laying	  the	  ground	  for	  rebel	  groups	  to	  gain	  support.118	  The	   three	   cases	   brought	   to	   attention	   here	   are	   not	   the	   only	  examples	   of	   a	   transitional	   justice	   process	   being	   launched	  domestically,	  or	   in	  combination	  with	  international	  efforts,	   in	  still	  conflicted	  and	  largely	  non-­‐transitional	  societies.119	  As	   such,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   devoting	   more	   attention	   to	   the	  implications	   of	   conceptualizing	   these	   cases	   as	   “transitional	  justice.”	   	   In	   particular,	   analysis	   of	   how	   the	   interests	   of	   different	  stakeholders	   intertwine	   in	   shaping	   judicial	   responses	   to	   serious	  human	  rights	  abuses,	  and	  what	   interests	  are	  served	  by	  referring	  to	   these	   practices	  within	   a	   transitional	   justice	   paradigm,	   appear	  as	  most	  vital	  measures	  when	  attempting	  to	  understand	  what	  it	  is	  that	  we	  actually	  see	  in	  these	  cases.	  	  In	  analyzing	  this	  type	  of	  cases,	  it	   is	   crucial	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   one	   cannot	   suppose	   that	  decision-­‐makers	   at	   the	   national	   level	   have	   a	   sincere	   interest	   in	  reforming	   governance.	   	   Analyses	   are	   therefore	   obliged	   to	   take	  into	  account	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  transitional	  justice	  functions	  to	   shun	   more	   profound	   reform	   that	   may	   be	   crucial	   for	   ending	  conflict	   and	   creating	   a	  more	   just	   society.	   	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   one	  must	  maintain	   realistic	   expectations	   to	  what	   transitional	   justice	  can	   actually	   achieve	   in	   instances	   where	   a	   fundamental	   political	  transition	  is	  absent	  and	  societies	  remain	  deeply	  conflicted.	  While	   the	   cases	   discussed	   here	   share	   the	   feature	   that	  transitional	   justice	   entails	   some	   amount	   of	   commitment	   by	  national	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  deal	  with	  grave	  abuses,	  there	  are	  also	  cases	  where	  the	  state	  is	  entirely	  opposed	  to	  do	  so.	  Recent	  developments	  in	  Sudan	  provides	  clear	  examples	  of	  how	  accountability	   can	   be	   pursued	   when	   a	   profound	   political	  transition	  is	  absent	  and	  the	  conflict	  is	  still	  ongoing,	  and	   the	  state	  	   118 See,	  e.g.,	  INTERNATIONAL	  CRISIS	  GROUP,	  supra	  note	  117.	  119 Burundi	  may	  be	  said	   to	  provide	  another	  example.	   	  The	  2000	  Arusha	  Accords	  called	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   truth	   and	   reconciliation	   commission	   and	   the	  establishment	  of	  an	   international	  commission	  of	   inquiry	   into	  past	  abuses.	   	   In	  2004,	  the	  Burundian	  parliament	  passed	  a	  bill	  on	  a	  truth	  commission.	  	  The	  commission	  has	  yet	   to	   be	   implemented.	   	   In	   2005,	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	   endorsed	   the	   so-­‐called	  Kalomoh	   report,	   which	   calls	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   truth	   and	   reconciliation	  commission	   and	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   special	   chambers	   to	   try	   those	   responsible	   for	  atrocities.	   	   Since	   2005,	   a	   coalition	   government	   has	   been	   in	   place,	   headed	   by	   the	  CNDD-­‐FDD.	   	   The	   UN	   and	   international	   civil	   society	   organizations	   continue	   to	  negotiate	   with	   the	   government	   concerning	   the	   implementation	   of	   measures	   of	  transitional	   justice.	   	   Some	   of	   those	   in	   government	   are	   likely	   to	   oppose	  comprehensively	   dealing	   with	   past	   abuses	   because	   they	   have	   been	   involved	   in	  atrocities.	   	  Moreover,	   the	  current	  government	   is	   still	   involved	   in	  a	   low-­‐scale	  armed	  struggle	  with	   the	  FNL,	   leading	   to	  accusations	  of	  gross	  human	  rights	  violations.	   	  See	  INTERNATIONAL	   CENTER	   FOR	   TRANSITIONAL	   JUSTICE,	   BURUNDI,	  http://ictj.org/en/where/region1/512.html	   (last	   visited	   Feb.	   8,	   2011).	   	   For	   an	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   transitional	   justice	   attempts	   in	   Burundi,	   see	   Stef	   Vandeginste,	  TRANSITIONAL	   JUSTICE	   FOR	  BURUNDI:	  A	  LONG	  AND	  WINDING	  ROAD,	  WORKSHOP	  10	  REPORT,	  BUILDING	   A	   FUTURE	   ON	   PEACE	   AND	   JUSTICE	   (2007),	   http://www.peace-­‐justice-­‐conference.info/download/WS10-­‐Vandeginste%20report.pdf.	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  lacks	   any	   form	  of	   commitment	   to	  deal	  with	   systematic	   and	  very	  grave	   abuses.	   	   Dealing	   with	   the	   conflict	   in	   Darfur	   is	   not	   only	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  achieving	  peace	   and	  ending	   large-­‐scale	  rights-­‐violations.	   	   Even	   if	   violations	   are	   still	   ongoing,	   such	  speculations	  coexist	  with	  debates	  on	  how	  to	  achieve	  justice.	  	  To	  a	  certain	   extent,	   these	   paradigms	   have	   intertwined	   in	   that	   some	  observers	   argue	   that	   only	   by	   pursuing	   accountability	   can	   the	  abuses	   end.120	   	   Others,	   however,	   suggest	   that	   the	   quest	   for	  accountability	  endangers	  peace	  processes	  and	  may	   lead	   to	  more	  or	  worse	  abuses.121	  The	  fact	  remains	  that	  war	  criminals	  and	  perpetrators	  of	  crimes	  against	   humanity	   in	   Sudan	  have	   for	  decades	  had	   little	   reason	   to	  fear	   accountability.	   	   Lutz	  Oette	   explains	   this	   culture	   of	   impunity	  by	  “deficiencies	   in	   the	   legal	   framework;	   the	   lack	  of	   transparency	  and	   effective	   monitoring;	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   independent	  judiciary;	   and	   the	   failure	   to	   establish	   adequate	   accountability	  mechanisms	  in	  response	  to	  violations	  committed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  conflict.”122	   	   One	   interesting	   aspect	   of	   the	   general	   lack	   of	  accountability,	   for	   crimes	   committed	   in	  Darfur	  and	  elsewhere	   in	  Sudan,	  is	  that	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  separate	  legal	  regime	  for	  state	  officials,	  where	  prosecutors	  are	  required	  to	  obtain	  an	  approval	  by	  the	   superior	   to	   the	   official	   they	   would	   like	   to	   prosecute.123	   	   As	  pointed	   to	   above,	   ICC	   involvement	   in	   Uganda	   and	   Kenya	   (and	  even	   Colombia,	   though	   the	   Court	   is	   not	   officially	   involved)	   has	  influenced	  the	  shaping	  of	  domestic	  transitional	  justice	  responses.	  	  It	   is	   also	  worth	   noting	   that	   in	   Sudan,	   talks	   of	   ICC	   investigations	  brought	   about	   domestic	   reactions.	   	   In	   a	   move	   “ostensibly	  designed	   to	   show	   that	   domestic	   courts	  were	   able	   and	  willing	   to	  try	  such	  crimes,”	  a	  Special	  Criminal	  Court	  was	  established	  in	  2005	  to	   try	   crimes	   committed	   in	   Darfur.124	   	   The	   court,	   however,	   has	  only	   been	   able	   to	   try	   a	   very	   limited	   number	   of	   cases,	  mostly	   of	  ordinary	   offences	   rather	   than	   international	   crimes	   and	   only	  concerning	   low-­‐level	   perpetrators.	   	   This	   makes	   one	   observer	  comment	   that	   “by	   all	   accounts,	   the	   Court	   and	   other	   related	  measures	   have	   failed	   to	   constitute	   a	   credible	   accountability	  
	   120 See,	  e.g.,	  Press	  Release,	  Transnational	  Radical	  Party,	  No	  Peace	  Without	   Justice	  Welcomes	   ICC	   Prosecutor’s	   Decision	   to	   Launch	   Investigations	   in	   Darfur	   (June	   6,	  2005)	   available	   at	   http://www.radicalparty.org/en/content/no-­‐peace-­‐without-­‐justice-­‐welcomes-­‐icc-­‐prosecutor’s-­‐decision-­‐launch-­‐investigations-­‐darfur.	  121 See,	  e.g.,	  Naseem	  Badiey,	  Ocampo	  v.	  Bashir:	  The	  Perspective	  from	  Juba	  (July	  18,	  2008)	  (on	   file	  with	   the	  Oxford	  Transitional	   Justice	  Working	  Paper	  Series),	  available	  
at	  http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Badiey_Final.pdf.	  122 Lutz	   Oette,	   Another	   Piece	   in	   the	   Puzzle:	   Accountability	   and	   Justice	   for	  
International	  Crimes	  in	  Sudan,	  1	  (Aug.	  20,	  2008)	  (on	  file	  with	  the	  Oxford	  Transitional	  Justice	   Research	   Working	   Paper	   Series),	   available	   at	  http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/OetteFi.pdf.	  123 See	  id.	  at	  2.	  124 See	  id.	  at	  3.	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  mechanism.”125	   	   In	  2005,	  acting	  on	  a	  Security	  Council	   referral,126	  the	   ICC	   commenced	   investigations	   into	   crimes	   in	   Darfur.127	   	   In	  May	  of	  2007,	  these	  investigations	  led	  Pre-­‐Trial	  Chamber	  I	  to	  issue	  two	   arrest	   warrants	   against	   high-­‐profile	   Sudanese	   citizens	   (one	  being	  the	  former	  Minister	  for	  the	  Interior	  and	  the	  current	  serving	  Minister	   of	   Humanitarian	   Affairs;	   and	   the	   other	   a	   leader	   of	   the	  Janjaweed	  militia).128	  	  Then,	  on	  March	  4,	  2009,	  the	  ICC	  in	  a	  highly	  controversial	  move	   issued	   an	   arrest	   warrant	   against	   incumbent	  President	  Omar	  Bashir.129	  Very	   difficult	   questions	   arise	   as	   to	   how	   we	   should	   approach	  these	  attempts	  of	  doing	  justice	  for	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  in	  an	  ongoing	   conflict	   where	   there	   is	   little	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	  national	   leaders	   will	   deal	   with	   these	   crimes	   in	   the	   near	   future.	  	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  two	  overall	  ways	  of	  looking	  at	  ICC	  involvement	  in	  Sudan.	  One	  view	  builds	  on	  a	  universal	  understanding	  of	  justice	  where	  the	  development	  of	   international	  standards	  on	  accountability	  for	  serious	   abuses—and	   the	   establishment	   of	   institutions	   that	   can	  put	   into	   effect	   these	   principles—should	   be	   celebrated	   because	  they	  are	  indicators	  of	  an	  increased	  concern	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  attention	   to	   victims.	   	   This	   position	   will	   argue	   that	   these	  developments	  reflect	  that	  rights	  have	  become	  more	  central	  in	  the	  international	   domain.	   	   It	   claims	   to	   separate	   law	   and	   politics,	   or	  argues	  for	  the	  need	  to	  do	  so.	  	  This	  perception	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  ICC	  is	  altogether	  a	  “good	  thing”	  because	  it	   offers	   hope	   that	   standards	   on	   accountability	   can	   be	   more	  rigorously	   enforced.	   	   It	   would	   suggest	   that	   the	   more	   active	   the	  Court	   is	   the	   better.130	   	   According	   to	   such	   views,	   the	   ICC	   issuing	  arrest	   warrants	   for	   Sudanese	   leaders	   represents	   an	   important	  step	   forward	   in	   dealing	  with	   the	   situation	   in	   Darfur.	   	   From	   this	  perspective,	  the	  greatest	  merits	  of	  ICC	  actions	  are	  that	  they	  offer	  	   125 Id.	  126 U.N.	  S.C.	  Res.	  1593,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  S/Res/1593/2005	  (March	  31,	  2005).	  127 See	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20	  releases	  /2005/the%20prosecutor%20of%20the%20icc%20opens%20investigation%20in%20	  darfur?lan=en-­‐GB.	  128 Prosecutor	  v.	  Harun	  &	  Abd-­‐Al-­‐Rahman,	  Case	  No.	  ICC-­‐02/05-­‐01/07,	  Warrant	  of	  Arrest	   for	   Ahmand	   Harun	   (Apr.	   27,	   2007),	   available	   at	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/iccdocs	   /doc/doc279813	   .pdf;	   Prosecutor	   v.	   Harun	   &	   Abd-­‐Al-­‐Rahman,	   Case	  No.	  ICC-­‐02/05-­‐01/07,	  Warrant	  of	  Arrest	  for	  Ali	  Kushayb	  (Apr.	  27,	  2007),	  available	  at	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int	  /iccdocs/doc/doc279858	  .pdf.	  129 Prosecutor	   v.	   Bashir,	   Case	  No.	   ICC-­‐02/05-­‐01/09,	  Warrant	   of	  Arrest	   for	  Omar	  Hassan	  Ahmad	  Al	  Bashir	  (Mar.	  4,	  2009),	  available	  at	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/iccdocs	  /doc/doc639078	  .pdf.	  130 A	  common	  critique	  from	  these	  commentators	  is	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  insufficient	  powers,	  as	  opposed	  to	  whether	  international	  justice	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  move	  forward.	  	  
See,	  e.g.,	  Cees	  Flinterman,	  The	   International	  Criminal	  Court:	  Obstacle	  or	  Contribution	  
to	   an	   Effective	   System	   of	   Human	   Rights	   Protection?,	   in	   FROM	   SOVEREIGN	   IMPUNITY	   TO	  INTERNATIONAL	   ACCOUNTABILITY:	   THE	   SEARCH	   FOR	   JUSTICE	   IN	   A	   WORLD	   OF	   STATES	   264	  (Ramesh	  Thakur	  &	  Peter	  Malcontent	  eds.,	  2004).	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  hopes	   for	   accountability	  where	   there	  would	   probably	   otherwise	  never	  be	  any	  (a	  concrete	  justification),	  and	  that	  they	  are	  thought	  to	   facilitate	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   on	   the	   global	   scene	   (a	   principled	  justification).131	  According	   to	   the	   other	   view,	   ICC	   action	   on	   Bashir	   is	  problematic	  because	  it	  clashes	  with	  other	  important	  goals.	  	  Some	  say	   the	  Court’s	  move	   threatens	  stability	  and	  peace	   in	  Sudan	  and	  may	   lead	   to	  more	  abuses	  and	  suffering.132	   	  Others	   say	   the	   ICC	   is	  pushing	  Bashir	   and	  his	   comrades	   into	   a	   corner	  where	   they	  now	  have	  more	  reasons	  than	  ever	  not	  to	  give	  up	  power.133	  	  Still	  others	  say	  there	  are	  dangers	  that	  a	  potential	  ousting	  of	  Bashir	  can	  lead	  to	  hardliners	   taking	   over	   (with	   Bashir	   himself	   considered	   less	   a	  hardliner	   than	   most	   senior	   army	   officers).134	   	   It	   has	   also	   been	  argued	  that	  ICC	  involvement	  creates	  a	  regional	  backing	  for	  Bashir	  and	  resistance	  to	  the	  Court	  that	  would	  otherwise	  not	  be	  there.135	  	  Finally,	   because	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   the	  President	  will	   be	   arrested	  and	   transferred	   to	   The	   Hague,	   some	   criticize	   the	   Court’s	  endeavors	  since	  they	  are	  said	  to	  endanger	  its	  own	  legitimacy.136	  A	   polarized	   debate	   on	   this	   difficult	   question	   of	   whether	  indicting	  Bashir	  was	  a	  “good	   idea”	  seems	  almost	   inevitable.	   	  The	  purpose	   here	   is	   not	   to	   attempt	   to	   provide	   a	   straightforward	  answer	   to	   this	   question.	   	   Rather,	   the	   point	   is	   that	   in	  understanding	   and	   evaluating	   issues	   of	   justice	   in	   a	   case	   like	  Sudan,	   commentators	  will	   benefit	   from	   looking	   at	   consequences	  and	   concepts	   both	   familiar	   from	   other	   contexts	   of	   transitional	  justice,	   such	   as	   a	   potential	   tension	   between	   peace	   and	   criminal	  justice,	  and	  at	  consequences	  that	  take	  a	  quite	  different	  orientation	  than	  those	  debated	  when	  transitional	  justice	  is	  endorsed	  by	  state	  leaders	  after	  large-­‐scale	  abuses	  have	  ended.	  	  One	  important	  issue	  concerns	   the	   argument	   that	   ICC	   prosecutions	   end	   up	   being	  portrayed	   as	   a	   neo-­‐imperialist	   adventure.	   	   Increased	   backing	   of	  	   131 For	  a	  view	  that	  is	  endorsed	  by	  influential	  parts	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  movement,	  see	   ICC:	   Bashir	   Warrant	   is	   Warning	   to	   Abusive	   Leaders,	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   WATCH,	  http://www.hrw.org/node/81231	  (last	  visited	  Feb.	  9,	  2011).	  132 See,	  e.g.,	  Badiey,	  supra	  note	  121.	  	  This	  point	  of	  view	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  correct,	  at	  least	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   suffering	   increased	   following	   the	   ICC’s	   issuing	   of	   an	   arrest	  warrant	  because	  Bashir	  expelled	  a	  large	  number	  of	  humanitarian	  organizations	  from	  Darfur,	   leaving	  many	   IDP’s	   without	   needed	   assistance.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   Xan	   Rice	   &	   Tania	  Branigan,	   Sudanese	   President	   Expels	   Aid	   Agencies,	   THE	   GUARDIAN,	   Mar.	   5,	   2009,	  
available	   at	   http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/05/sudan-­‐aid-­‐agencies-­‐expelled.	  133 See,	   e.g.,	   Andrew	  Natsios,	  Waltz	  with	   Bashir:	  Why	   the	   Arrest	  Warrant	   against	  
Sudan’s	  President	  Will	  Serve	  Neither	  Peace	  nor	  Justice,	  FOREIGN	  AFFAIRS,	  Mar.	  23,	  2009,	  
available	   at	   http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64904/andrew-­‐natsios/waltz-­‐with-­‐bashir.	  134 Id.	  135 Id.	  136 See,	  e.g.,	  Clark,	  supra	  note	  109,	  at	  1	  (“The	  concern	  is	  not	  that	  the	  indictment	  of	  Bashir	   may	   have	   a	   negative	   effect	   but	   that	   it	   may	   have	   no	   effect	   at	   all,	   raising	  questions	  about	  the	  fundamental	  purpose	  of	  the	  ICC	  in	  responding	  to	  mass	  atrocity”).	  
2011]	   Transitional	  Justice	   37	  (alleged)	   war	   criminals	   resulting	   from	   an	   international	   body	  indicting	  a	  sitting	  head	  of	  state	  is	  a	  concern	  that	  should	  be	  taken	  seriously.	  	  It	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  legal	  regime	  can	  be	  separated	   from	   politics,	   while	   raising	   fundamental	   questions	   of	  “whose	   justice.”137	   	  Moreover,	   a	   key	   challenge	   to	   justice	   in	   such	  contexts	   is	   that	   we	   risk	   narrowing	   our	   conception	   of	   a	  complicated	   conflict	   to	   a	  matter	   of	   “good	   guys”	   and	   “bad	   guys,”	  while	  in	  reality	  more	  sustainable	  justice	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Sudan	  is	  likely	   to	   necessitate	   reform	   of	   governance.	   	   Such	   reforms	   may	  exactly	   require	   a	   more	   nuanced	   understanding	   of	   underlying	  causes	  of	  conflict.	  In	   sum,	   approaching	   cases	   of	   transitional	   justice	   in	   still	  conflicted	   societies	   that	   have	   not	   experienced	   a	   fundamental	  political	   transition	   requires	   the	   commentator	   to	   move	   beyond	  conceptions	   of	   transitional	   justice	   in	   times	   of	   transitions.	   	   Yet,	  looking	   at	   cases	   such	   as	   the	   Kenyan,	   Colombian,	   Ugandan,	   and	  Sudanese	   can	   benefit	   from	   the	   transitional	   justice	   scholar	  bringing	  with	  him	  a	  preference	  for	  appreciating	  law	  and	  justice	  in	  its	   societal	   context.	   	   Simply	   dismissing	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   field	  should	  occupy	  itself	  with	  instances	  where	  past	  or	  ongoing	  abuses	  are	   addressed	   under	   circumstances	   where	   a	   profound	   political	  transition	   is	   absent	   is	   problematic.	   	   First,	   it	   neglects	   that	   while	  these	   cases	   indeed	   pose	   significantly	   different	   challenges	   if	  compared	   to	   transitional	   justice	   in	   democratic	   transitions,	   they	  are	   nonetheless	   characterized	   by	   the	   application	   of	  many	   of	   the	  same	  processes	  that	  find	  use	  when	  abuses	  are	  dealt	  with	  under	  or	  after	   a	   fundamental	   political	   transition.	   	   Second,	   the	   fact	   that	  many	  of	   the	  concepts	  used	   in	  transitional	   justice	  discourses	  take	  radically	  different	  meanings	  when	  dealing	  with	  large-­‐scale	  abuses	  in	  still	  conflicted	  societies	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  these	  concepts	  are	  altogether	   irrelevant.	   	   Concerns	   of	   progressive	   societal	   change,	  for	   example,	   are	   relevant	   as	   benchmarks	   for	   the	   legitimacy	   of	  justice	   processes,	   although,	   in	   part,	   what	   makes	   up	   progressive	  change	   may	   have	   a	   different	   meaning	   in	   deeply	   conflicted	  societies.	   	   Similarly,	   concerns	   of	   how	   to	   provide	   victims	   with	  redress	  as	  well	   as	  questions	  of	  how	   to	   reconcile	   individuals	   and	  groups	   are	   also	   relevant	   in	   cases	   where	   there	   has	   not	   been	   a	  fundamental	   political	   transition.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   interests	  	   137 The	   question	   of	   whether	   the	   ICC,	   by	   so	   far	   focusing	   exclusively	   on	   African	  countries	   in	   its	   indictments	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  neo-­‐colonialist	  enterprise	   is	  interesting	  and	  subjected	   to	  quite	   intense	  debate	   in	   some	  African	   forums.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	  Assembly	  of	  the	  African	  Union,	  Decision	  of	  the	  Meeting	  of	  African	  States	  Parties	  to	  the	  
Rome	   Statute	   of	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Court	   (ICC),	   A.U.	   Doc.	   Assembly/AU/13	  (July	  3,	  2009).	  	  Likewise,	  some	  academics	  have	  questioned	  why	  the	  ICC	  only	  focuses	  on	   crimes	   on	   the	  African	   continent,	  when	   a	   large	  number	   of	   complaints	   have	  been	  made	  to	  the	  Court,	  including	  allegations	  of	  war	  crimes	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq,	  Israel,	  and	  elsewhere.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   Stephen	   Oola,	   Bashir	   and	   the	   ICC:	   The	   Aura	   or	   Audition	   of	  
International	   Justice	   in	   Africa	   (Oxford	   Transitional	   Justice	   Research	  Working	   Paper	  Series,	  2008),	  http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/OolaFin.pdf.	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   in	   these	   cases	   can	   be	   different	   and	   these	   objectives	  should	  partly	  be	  judged	  according	  to	  different	  standards,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  observers	  of	  transitional	  justice	  should	  reject	  to	   analyze	   them.	   	   To	   a	   certain	   extent,	   the	   lack	   of	   attention	   in	  general	  theory	  to	  the	  type	  of	  cases	  discussed	  here	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	   fact	   that	   when	   the	   field	   was	   born,	   the	   idea	   of	   confronting	  repression	  and	  mass	  violence	  was	  in	  fact	  typically	  preconditioned	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  profound	  political	  transformation.	  	  Yet	  times	  have	  changed,	  and	  if	  the	  field	  wants	  to	  maintain	  its	  relevance	  for	  the	   real	  world,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   engaging	  with	   the	   theoretical	  implications	  that	  follow	  from	  these	  developments.	  
B.	  	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Consolidated	  Democracies	  Transitional	   justice	   in	   consolidated	   democracies	   is	   a	   subject	  that	  has	  had	  limited	  influence	  on	  the	  shaping	  and	  development	  of	  transitional	   justice	   theory,	   or	   perhaps	   put	   more	   correctly,	   has	  been	   marginalized	   by	   mainstream	   conceptions	   of	   transitional	  justice,	  while	  tending	  to	  be	  discussed	  in	  a	  rather	  separate	  sphere.	  	  Nonetheless,	   it	   is	  now	  a	  common	  phenomenon	  that	  consolidated	  democracies	  establish	  some	  of	  the	  processes	  that	  resemble	  those	  that	   are	   used	   in	   fundamental	   political	   transitions	   when	   dealing	  with	  legacies	  of	  violence	  and	  injustices.	  In	   Australia,	   attempts	   to	   deal	   with	   systematic	   human	   rights	  abuses	  against	  aboriginals	  have	  been	  a	  central	   theme	  in	  political	  debates	  for	  some	  time.	   	   In	  1995,	  the	  Attorney	  General	  mandated	  the	   Australian	   Human	   Rights	   Commission	   to	   inquire	   into	   the	  state’s	   practices	   until	   the	   early	   1970s	   concerning	   the	   forcible	  removal	  of	  aboriginal	  children	  from	  their	  parents.138	  	  In	  1997,	  the	  Commission’s	  report,	  “Bringing	  Them	  Home:	  The	  Stolen	  Children	  Report,”	  was	  handed	  over	  to	  Parliament	  and	  made	  public.139	  	  The	  report	   includes	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   recommendations,	   such	   as	  monetary	  compensation	  to	  the	  victims	  of	  forcible	  removal	  and	  for	  the	   Australian	   government	   officially	   to	   apologize	   for	   endorsing	  these	  practices.140	   	   Then	  Prime	  Minister	   John	  Howard	   stated	  his	  regret	   for	   these	   injustices,	   but	   it	   was	   not	   until	   February	   2008,	  after	  Kevin	  Rudd	  took	  office	  that	  a	  formal	  apology	  was	  offered	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  of	  the	  state	  (February	  2008).141	  	  The	  question	  of	  compensation	  remains	  a	  controversial	  issue,	  with	  funding	  created	  in	  some	  states	  but	  not	  in	  others.142	  In	   Canada,	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	  Commission	   in	   2008	   presents	   a	   move	   to	   deal	   with	   legacies	   of	  	   138 See	   THE	  AUSTRALIAN	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  COMM’N,	  BRINGING	  THEM	  HOME:	  THE	   ‘STOLEN	  CHILDREN’	   REPORT	   (1997),	   http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/bth_report	  /index.html.	  139 Id.	  140 Id.	  141 Id.	  142 Id.	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  human	   rights	   injustices	   committed	   against	   the	   indigenous	  population.	  	  These	  injustices	  concerned	  the	  forcible	  placement	  of	  children	   in	   Christian	   boarding	   schools	   where	   they	   were	   to	   be	  “culturally	   assimilated,”	   not	   entirely	   unlike	   the	   rationale	   in	  Australia.	  	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  commission	  was	  preceded	  by	  the	   Canadian	   government,	   in	   2006,	   agreeing	   to	   compensate	  around	  80,000	  victims	  of	   these	  practices,	  with	  a	   total	  amount	  of	  around	   two	   billion	   Canadian	   dollars.	   	   In	   2008,	   Canadian	   Prime	  Minister	  Stephen	  Harper	  offered	  an	  apology	  to	  the	  victims.143	  Other	   consolidated	   democracies	   have,	   in	   different	   ways,	  attempted	   to	  deal	  with	  past	  wrongdoings,	  whether	   against	   their	  own	   citizens	   or	   in	   an	   international	   context.	   	   In	   particular,	   these	  democracies	  have	  offered	  apologies	  for	  past	  abuses,	  including	  the	  treatment	   of	   indigenous	   populations,	   colonialism,	   slavery,	  involvement	   in	   the	   Rwandan	   genocide,	   and	   other	   instances	   of	  “past	  wrongdoing.”144	  With	   some	   important	   exceptions,145	   general	   studies	   of	  transitional	  justice	  have	  not	  been	  particularly	  occupied	  with	  these	  cases.	   	  A	  number	  of	   inquires,	  usually	  not	  referring	  to	  themselves	  as	   studies	   of	   transitional	   justice,	   had	   reparations	   for	   past	  systematic	   rights	   violations	   in	   consolidated	   democracies	   as	   a	  central	   theme.	   	   Elezar	   Barkan,	   for	   example,	   argues	   that,	  “international	   public	   opinion	   and	   organizations	   are	   increasingly	  attentive	  to	  moral	  issues”	  and	  that	  these	  issues	  require	  attention	  to	  restitution.146	   	  Barkan	  views	  this	   trend	  of	  offering	  reparations	  	   143 See	   INT’L	   CTR.	   FOR	   TRANSITIONAL	   JUSTICE,	   CANADA’S	   TRUTH	   AND	   RECONCILIATION	  COMM’N	  (Apr.	  29,	  2008),	  http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/1652	  .html.	  	  See	  also	  
Canada	   Apology	   for	   Native	   Schools,	   BBC	   NEWS	   (June	   11,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/mobile/americas/7447811.stm.	  144 Besides	  Australia	  and	  Canada,	  countries	  such	  as	  New	  Zealand	  have	  offered	  an	  apology	  and	  compensated	  its	  indigenous	  population	  for	  unfair	  treatment	  in	  the	  past.	  	  
See,	   e.g.,	   Kathy	   Marks,	   A	   £160m	   Apology	   to	   the	   Maoris	   for	   Shameful	   History	   of	  
Injustices,	   THE	   INDEPENDENT,	   June	   26,	   2008,	  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/a-­‐163160m-­‐apology-­‐to-­‐the-­‐maoris-­‐for-­‐shameful-­‐history-­‐of-­‐injustice-­‐854333.html.	   	   Some	   former	   colonial	  powers,	   most	   clearly	   perhaps	   the	   case	   with	   Germany,	   have	   expressed	   remorse,	  although	  not	  directly	  apologized,	  for	  some	  aspects	  of	  their	  colonial	  past.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Ger.	  Bundestag,	   Declaration	   of	   the	   Ger.	   Bundestag	   Namib.	   Resolution	   15th	   Legislative	  Period,	  Doc.	  15/3329	  (June	  16,	  2004).	  	  In	  2009,	  the	  U.S.	  Senate	  unanimously	  passed	  a	  resolution	  apologizing	  for	  slavery,	  however,	  noting	  that	  the	  resolution	  is	  not	  relevant	  for	  attempts	  to	  file	  court	  cases	  for	  compensation.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Krissah	  Thompson,	  Senate	  
Backs	   Apology	   for	   Slavery,	   WASH.	   POST	   (June	   19,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­‐dyn/content/article/2009/06/18/	  AR2009061803877.html.	  	  Around	  2000,	  both	  the	  Belgian	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  UN	  acknowledged	  their	  responsibility	  for	  failing	  to	  prevent	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide.	  	  See,	  
e.g.,	   Belgian	   Apology	   to	   Rwanda,	   BBC	   NEWS	   (Apr.	   7,	   2000),	   available	   at	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/705402	   .stm;	  UN	  Admits	   Failure	   in	  Rwanda,	   BBC	  NEWS,	  (Dec.	  16,	  1999)	  available	  at	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/568566.stm.	  145 See	   MARTHA	   MINNOW,	   BETWEEN	   VENGEANCE	   AND	   FORGIVENESS:	   FACING	   HISTORY	  AFTER	  GENOCIDE	  AND	  MASS	  VIOLENCE	  91–117	  (1998).	  146 ELEZAR	  BARKAN,	  THE	  GUILT	  OF	  NATIONS:	  RESTITUTION	  AND	  NEGOTIATING	  HISTORICAL	  INJUSTICES	  308	  (2000).	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   victims	   of	   past	   injustices	   in	   consolidated	   democracies	   as	   an	  indication	   of	   adherence	   to	   these	   dominant	   norms	   and	   as	   an	  exercise	  that	  serves	  self-­‐affirmation.147	  	  Thus,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	   partial	   academic	   division,	   where	   consolidated	   democracies’	  dealing	  with	  past	  injustices	  are	  considered	  separately	  from	  those	  cases	  which	  have	  provided	  the	   foundation	  of	   transitional	   justice,	  namely	   new	   democracies’	   dealing	   with	   repression	   under	   prior	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  From	   certain	   perspectives,	   this	   division	   seems	   well	   justified.	  	  Key	  concepts	  such	  as	   liberal	  change	  are	   likely	   to	   take	  a	  radically	  different	   meaning	   when	   consolidated	   democracies	   decide	   to	  account	   for	   past	   abuses.	   	   That,	   however,	   does	   not	   mean	   that	  increased	   attention	   should	   not	   be	   paid	   to	   consolidated	  democracies’	   dealing	   with	   past—and	   ongoing—violations,	   nor	  does	   it	   mean	   that	   we	   should	   not	   scrutinize	   these	   societies’	  identification	   of	   which	   problems	   should	   be	   considered	   along	   a	  paradigm	   of	   redress	   and	   justice.	   	   One	   danger	   embedded	   in	  reserving	  the	  concept	  of	  transitional	  justice	  to	  societies	  in	  radical	  change	  is	  that	  it	  implies	  a	  moral	  differentiation.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  mainly	  poor	  countries	  in	  “transition”	  are	  seen	  as	  having	  endemic	  problems	   with	   gross	   violations	   of	   human	   rights.	   	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	   consolidated	  democracies,	  mainly	   in	   the	  West,	  are	   implied	  to	   be	   free	   of	   such	  mess	   and	   only	   have	   a	   need	   to	   come	   to	   terms	  with	   practices	   that	   took	   place	   in	   a	   relatively	   distant	   past	   (and	  usually	   in	   a	   softer	   way	   that	   excludes	   talks	   of	   criminal	  accountability).	   	   One	   might	   argue	   that	   when	  Western	   countries	  define	  their	  need	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  past	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  looking	  into	  practices	   concerning	   indigenous	   populations,	   slavery,	   or	  colonialism,	   it	   overlooks	   dealing	   with	   gross	   human	   rights	  violations	  taking	  place	   in	  the	  present,	   for	  example	   in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism.148	   	  Moreover,	   it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  willingness	   to	   confront	   past	   wrongdoings	   is	   not	   a	   phenomenon	  that	   can	   be	   recognized	   in	   all	   consolidated	   democracies.	   	   In	  Denmark,	  for	  example,	  calls	  for	  accountability	  measures	  for	  gross	  human	  rights	  violations,	  calls	   for	  strengthening	  an	  “international	  rule	  of	   law,”	   and	  eager	  assistance	   to	  poor	   countries’	   attempts	  of	  dealing	   with	   legacies	   of	   past	   injustices	   are	   not	   necessarily	  indicative	   of	   how	   this	   country	   deals	   with	   its	   own	   legacies	   of	  
	   147 Id.	  at	  315.	  	  Barkan’s	  appraisal	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  consolidated	  democracies,	  but	  it	  is	  made	  clear	  that	  “today	  liberal	  societies	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  most	  to	  recognize	  past	  public	   injustices”	   and	   most	   of	   the	   analysis	   concentrates	   on	   Western	   democracies’	  dealing	  with	  past	  injustices.	  148 Interestingly,	   there	   might	   now	   be	   a	   change	   in	   this	   understanding.	   	   As	   an	  example,	  discussions	  of	  a	  truth	  commission	  and/or	  accountability	  for	  U.S.	  practices	  in	  the	  War	   on	   Terrorism	   are	   starting	   to	   take	   place.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   Randall	   Mikkelsen,	  U.S.	  
Senator	   Seeks	   Bush-­‐Era	   “Truth	   Commission,”	   REUTERS	   (Feb.	   9,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.reuters	   .com/article/idUSTRE5186JZ20090210	   (quoting	   U.S.	   Senator	  Patrick	  Leahy).	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  abuses.149	   	   It	   is	   noteworthy	   that	   the	   Danish	   prime	   minister	  recently	   refused	   to	   inquire	   further	   into	   “experiments”	   in	   the	  1950s	   where	   Greenlandic	   children	   were	   forcibly	   removed	   from	  their	   parents	   and	   placed	   in	   Danish	   institutions	   or	   with	   Danish	  foster	  parents.150	  
CONCLUSION	  There	  are	  significant	  problems	  connected	  to	  understanding	  the	  complex	   and	   very	   diverse	   instances	   of	   transitional	   justice	   by	  relying	   on	   a	   theoretical	   framework	   that	   is	   heavily	   influenced	  by	  ideas	  about	  transitions	  from	  authoritarian	  rule	  to	  democracy	  that	  were	   developed	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   and	   early	   1990s.	   	   Though	   the	  scholarship	   analyzes	   cases	   that	   are	   radically	   different	   from	  “transitions	   to	   democracy,”	   the	   conceptual	   underpinnings	   of	  transitional	   justice	   as	   an	   academic	   field	   continue	   to	   be	   heavily	  influenced	   by	   values	   and	   understandings	   of	   dilemmas	   that	  connect	   intimately	   to	   liberal	   transitions.	   	   In	   a	   world	   where	  systematically	   dealing	   with	   serious	   abuses	   can	   take	   place	   in	  democratic	   transitions,	   in	   non-­‐liberal	   transitions,	   as	   well	   as	   in	  highly	   diverse	   contexts	   of	   non-­‐transitions,	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   need	  for	   “updating”	   transitional	   justice	   theory.	   	   This	   Article	   has	  proposed	  that	  liberal	  transitions	  are	  only	  one	  among	  a	  number	  of	  key	  scenarios	  in	  which	  a	  systematic	  and	  institutionalized	  dealing	  with	   serious	   human	   rights	   abuses	   occurs;	   and	   a	   number	   of	  observations	  have	  been	  made	  on	   the	  different	   interests	   that	   can	  be	   pursued	   by	   stakeholders	   in	   transitional	   justice.	   Further,	   the	  Article	  has	  discussed	  how	  we	  should	  evaluate	  transitional	  justice	  in	  these	  different	  contexts.	  Rejecting	   a	   uniform	   normative	   framework	   for	   evaluating	  transitional	   justice,	   however,	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   we	   cannot	  formulate	  some	  general	  positive	  goals	  of	  transitional	  justice.	  	  How	  to	  reach	  these	  goals,	  however,	  will	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  depend	  on	  the	  type	  of	  case	  in	  question.	  A	  chief	  goal	  is	  preventing	  the	  recurrence	  of	  abuses.	  	  If	  we	  agree	  with	  Kofi	  Annan	  when	  he	   insists	   that	   “an	  ounce	  of	  prevention	   is	  	   149 See,	   e.g.,	   DEN.	   MINISTRY	   OF	   FOREIGN	   AFFAIRS,	   DANMARKS	   MEDLEMSKAB	   AF	  SIKKERHEDSRÅDET	  2005–06:	  ERFARINGSOPSAMLINGSRAPPORT	   [DENMARK’S	  MEMBERSHIP	  OF	  THE	   UN	   SECURITY	   COUNCIL:	   LESSONS	   LEARNED]	   (2007),	   http://www	  .netpublikationer.dk/um/7784/pdf/nyweb.pdf.	  150 Only	   recently	   have	   these	   questions	   reached	   a	   central	   place	   in	   the	   political	  debate	  in	  Denmark.	   	  Some	  parties	  are	  suggesting	  a	  truth	  commission	  and	  an	  official	  apology	   from	   the	   Danish	   government.	   	   Prime	   Minister	   Lars	   Løkke	   Rasmussen,	  however,	   refuses	   to	   take	   any	   further	   action	   because	   these	   practices	   were	  “unfortunate,”	   but	   belong	   to	   another	   era	   where	   “intentions	   were	   good,”	   and,	   it	   is	  argued,	  we	   should	   instead	  be	   “pleased	   that	   times	  have	   changed.”	   	  See	  Hagen	  Højer	  Christensen,	   Statsminister	   Lars	   Løkke	   Siger	   Nej	   til	   Officiel	   Undskyldning	   [Prime	  
Minister	   Lars	   Løkke	   Refuses	   to	   Offer	   Official	   Apology],	   GREENLANDIC	   BROADCASTING	  CORPORATION	   (Aug.	   19,	   2009),	   available	   at	   http://www	  .knr.gl/index.php?id=183&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=47594&tx_ttnews[backPid]=143&cHash=f5b64b8014.	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  more	   than	   a	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  of	   cure,”151	   this	   is	   a	   very	  important	   goal	   of	   transitional	   justice.	   	   However,	   the	   question	   of	  prevention	   takes	   different	   forms	   in	   different	   contexts.	   	   In	   cases	  such	  as	  that	  of	  Colombia,	  “prevention,”	  at	  least	  initially,	  translates	  into	   halting	   ongoing	   abuses,	   but	   in	   cases	   such	   as	   the	   Latin	  American,	  it	  primarily	  means	  attempting	  to	  prevent	  the	  return	  of	  military	   dictatorships	   while	   consolidating	   a	   democratic	   order	  based	  on	  rule	  of	  law	  principles.	  The	   role	   of	   transitional	   justice	   in	   helping	   to	   achieve	   this	  preventive	   objective	   obviously	   varies	   according	   to	   the	   context.	  	  Sometimes,	   as	   when	   consolidated	   democracies	   confront	   abuses	  committed	  in	  a	  relatively	  distant	  past,	  the	  commitment	  to	  prevent	  (the	   same	   kind	   of)	   injustices	   and	   abuses	   from	   recurring	   may	  already	  be	  present	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  current	  political	  leadership.	  	  From	   a	   preventive	   perspective,	   the	   most	   important	   role	   of	  transitional	  justice	  in	  such	  cases	  may	  be	  labeling	  certain	  practices	  as	   unjust	   in	   the	   public	   domain.	   	   In	   other	   cases,	   such	   as	   when	  rights	   violations	   are	   ongoing	   in	   deeply	   conflicted	   societies,	  demobilization	   of	   paramilitaries,	   a	   political	   settlement	   and	  reforms	  that	  allow	  for	  restructuring	  of	  abusive	  state	   institutions,	  and	   increased	   transparency	   and	   accountability	   can	   be	   vital	  measures.	   	   In	   cases	   such	  as	   that	   of	  Rwanda,	  where	   abuses	  were	  connected	   to	   an	   identity-­‐based	   conflict,	   the	   question	   of	   how	   to	  reconcile	  groups	  within	  society	  may	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  issues	   for	   preventing	   the	   return	   to	   conflict—and	   thus	   for	  preventing	   large-­‐scale	   abuses.	   	   In	   cases	   such	   as	   the	   Kenyan,	  where	  we	  have	  seen	  decades	  of	  impunity	  for	  political	  violence,	  it	  may	  be	  particularly	  desirable	  to	  pursue	  criminal	  justice	  for	  (some	  of)	  the	  perpetrators.	  	  Yet,	  focusing	  alone	  on	  trial	  and	  punishment	  will	   tend	   to	   prove	   insufficient,	   particularly	   in	   cases	   where	  violence	   is	   related	   to	   long-­‐standing	  grievances	   and	   structures	   in	  society	  which	  marginalize	  certain	  groups.	  This	   is	   closely	   connected	   to	   a	   second	   goal	   of	   creating	   a	  more	  just	  society.	  	  Although	  in	  many	  cases,	  issues	  such	  as	  liberalization	  and	   democratization	  may	   in	   the	   long-­‐term	   be	   vital	   for	   reaching	  this	   goal,	   these	   are	   not	   the	   only	   dimensions	   of	   creating	   a	  more	  just	   society,	   and	   the	   relevance	   of	   these	   particular	   elements	  depends	  on	  the	  context.	  In	   cases	   where	   abuses	   were	   committed	   by	   a	   limited	   set	   of	  actors	   under	   a	   prior	   authoritarian	   or	   totalitarian	   regime,	   it	   is	  highly	   desirable	   if	   transitional	   justice	   can	   contribute	   to	  strengthening	  liberal	  values	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  	  However,	  as	  this	  Article	  has	  argued,	  issues	  such	  as	  democratization	  and	  freedom	  of	  expression	  may	  under	  other	  circumstances	  contravene	  with	  goals	  	   151 THE	  SEC’Y-­‐GEN.,	  THE	  RULE	  OF	  LAW	  AND	  TRANSITIONAL	  JUSTICE	  IN	  CONFLICT	  AND	  POST-­‐CONFLICT	   SOCIETIES:	   REPORT	   OF	   THE	   SECRETARY-­‐GENERAL,	   at	   3,	   U.N.	   Doc.	   S/2004/616	  (2004).	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  of	  security	  and	  nation	  building,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  initial	  post-­‐conflict	  phase.	   	   What	   is	   more,	   it	   is	   not	   always	   realistic	   to	   expect	   that	  extremely	  poor	  countries	  emerging	  out	  of	  large-­‐scale	  conflict	  can	  pursue	   these	  goals	   in	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	  of	  mass	  violence.	  	  In	   these	   cases,	   it	   may	   be	   necessary	   to	   distinguish	   between	  different	   phases	   of	   post-­‐conflict,	   where	   the	   first	   step	   to	  transitional	  justice	  may	  be	  a	  question	  of	  securing	  an	  environment	  where	   conflict	   is	   absent.	   	   Only	   later	   on	   can	   liberalization	   and	  democratization	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  project	  of	  transforming	  society.	  It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   keep	   in	  mind	   that	   creating	   a	  more	   just	  society	   is	   not	   only	   a	   question	   of	   liberalization	   and	  democratization.	  	  Especially	  in	  highly	  unequal	  post-­‐conflict	  or	  still	  conflicted	   societies,	   there	   can	   be	   an	   element	   of	   group-­‐based	  marginalization.	   	   Creating	   a	   more	   just	   society	   may	   require	   that	  far-­‐reaching	   reforms	  are	   carried	  out	   to	   change	   such	  patterns.	   	   If	  access	   to	   political,	   economic,	   and	   social	   resources	   is	   not	   made	  more	   equal,	   chances	   are	   that	   those	   victimized	   in	   the	   past	   will	  continue	   to	   feel	   victimized,	   or	   that	   new	   groups	   will	   be	  marginalized.	  	  If	  so,	  risks	  are	  high	  for	  a	  return	  to	  violent	  conflict.	  In	  cases	  such	  as	  that	  of	  Rwanda,	  where	  a	  new	  regime	  embarks	  on	  a	  path	   to	   comprehensively	   address	  past	   abuses,	   the	  question	  remains	   whether	   the	   new	   regime	   also	   supports	   the	  implementation	  of	  reforms	  so	  that	  large	  groups	  in	  society	  do	  not	  feel	   marginalized	   or	   excluded	   from	   the	   administration	   of	   the	  country	   and	   from	  access	   to	   economic	   resources.	   	  Ultimately,	   the	  greatest	  risk	  for	   long-­‐term	  peace	  in	  a	  country	  such	  as	  Rwanda	  is	  not	   necessarily	   that	   transitional	   justice	   in	   certain	   aspects	   has	  resulted	   in	   limits	   to	   a	   number	   of	   freedoms,	   but	   rather,	   the	   risk	  that	   transitional	   justice	   contributes	   to	   the	   perception	   that	   the	  current	   regime	   is	   an	   ethnically	   based	   authoritarian	   regime.	   	   The	  extent	  to	  which	  what	  Filip	  Reyntjens	  refers	  to	  as	  an	  “RPF-­‐ization”	  will	  be	  identified	  with	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  “Tutsization,”	  	  in	  other	  words,	   appears	   crucial	   for	   Rwanda’s	   future.152	   	   If	   groups	   in	  Rwanda	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  excluded	  from	  influence	  and	  resources,	  these	  groups	  are	  unlikely	  to	  perceive	  the	  “new	  Rwanda”	  as	  a	  just	  Rwanda,	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  risk	  that	  mass	  violence	  may	  once	  again	   erupt.	   	   In	   this	   way,	   there	   can	   be	   an	   intimate	   connection	  between	  the	  goal	  of	  constructing	  a	  more	  just	  society	  and	  the	  goal	  of	  preventing	  large-­‐scale	  abuses.	  Even	   in	   cases	   of	   liberal	   transitions,	  where	   transitional	   justice	  has	   often	   been	   labeled	   a	   success	   story,	   extremely	   unequal	  distribution	  of	  resources	  may	  challenge	  conventional	  conceptions	  of	   what	   in	   fact	   are	   the	   criteria	   for	   success.	   	   South	   Africa,	   for	  instance,	   has	   been	   successful	   in	   ensuring	   a	   peaceful	  transformation	   to	   democracy	   and	   the	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	  	   152 Reyntjens,	  supra	  note	  25,	  at	  187.	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  Commission	   (TRC)	   managed	   to	   account	   for	   the	   horrors	   of	  Apartheid	   while	   bringing	   victims	   and	   perpetrators	   together	   in	  one	   forum.	   	   Yet,	   the	   transformation	   has	   in	   important	   aspects	  failed	  to	  implement	  measures	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  society	  where	  groups	   have	   more	   equal	   opportunities.	   	   It	   has	   rightly	   been	  pointed	  out	  that	  in	  South	  Africa,	  “gross	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	  involve	   mainly	   (and	   not	   peripherally)	   the	   victimization	   of	  communities	   (and	   not	   individuals).”153	   	   While	   the	   TRC	   defined	  victims	  in	  a	  narrow	  way,	  this	  institution	  of	  transitional	  justice	  did	  in	   fact	   put	   forward	   recommendations	   for	   the	  new	  democracy	   to	  attend	   to	   creating	   equal	   access	   to	   resources.	   	   Only	   to	   a	   limited	  extent,	  however,	  have	  these	  recommendations	  been	  acted	  on.	  	  As	  Charles	  Villa-­‐Vicencio	  notes,	   “some	  recommendations	  have	  since	  been	   implemented	   and	   some	   rejected,	   while	   many	   have	   simply	  been	   ignored.”154	   	   Despite	   the	   turn	   to	   democratic	   rule,	   South	  Africa	   remains	   among	   the	  most	   unequal	   countries	   in	   the	  world.	  	  This	  inequality	  has	  a	  group-­‐based	  nature,	  which	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  Apartheid	  regime’s	  construction	  of	  society,	  creating	  a	  problem	  that	   may	   impede	   on	   objectives	   of	   transitional	   justice.	   	   A	   recent	  report	  by	  the	  Institute	  for	  Justice	  and	  Reconciliation	  notes,	  “while	  growing	   income	   inequality	   has	   been	   a	   disquieting	   global	  phenomenon	   in	  recent	  decades,	   its	  manifestation	   in	  South	  Africa	  also	   has	   a	   perturbing	   racial	   dimension,”	   thus	  making	   inequality	  the	   most	   common	   source	   of	   division	   between	   communities.155	  	  Although	   large-­‐scale	   political	   violence	   has	   by	   and	   large	   been	  avoided	   in	   post-­‐Apartheid	   South	   Africa,	   enormous	   challenges	  concerning	   violent	   crime	   appear	   closely	   related	   to	   group-­‐based	  marginalization	   and	   the	   persistence	   of	   devastating	   poverty	   in	  many	  communities.156	  Also	   in	  many	   other	   contexts,	   the	   question	   of	   how	   to	   create	   a	  more	   just	   society	   requires	   that	   increased	   attention	   is	   paid	   to	  reforms	   aimed	   at	   more	   inclusive	   governance	   and	   equality	   in	  	  access	   to	   economic	   and	   social	   resources.	   	   In	  Uganda,	   legacies	   of	  political	  violence	  have	   roots	   in	  group-­‐based	  marginalization	  and	  exclusion.	   	   Yet,	   the	   debate	   about	   transitional	   justice	   focuses	  primarily	   on	   accountability,	   truth	   telling,	   and	   re-­‐integration	   of	  	   153 RAMA	  MANI,	  BEYOND	  RETRIBUTION:	   SEEKING	   JUSTICE	   IN	   THE	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  OF	  WAR	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  (2002)	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  Mahmood	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  a	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  combatants.157	  	  In	  Central	  American	  countries	  such	  as	  Guatemala,	  conflict	  was	  closely	  related	  to	  historically	  nested	  inequality	  with	  a	  clear	   group-­‐based	   character.	   	   Despite	   the	   pursuit	   of	   transitional	  justice	   in	   that	   country,	  many	  of	   these	   root	   causes	  of	   conflict	   are	  yet	   to	   be	   addressed.158	   	   Though	   military	   regimes	   have	   been	  ousted	   in	   the	   Southern	   Cone	   and	   different	   attempts	   have	   been	  made	   to	  confront	  past	  abuses,	   large	   landowners	  and	  other	  elites	  who	   had	   tended	   to	   support	   authoritarianism	   continue	   to	   enjoy	  privileges	  while	   inequality,	   sometimes	   as	   in	   Brazil	   having	   racial	  undertones,	  still	  threatens	  security	  in	  some	  of	  these	  countries.159	  The	  failure	  or	  the	  success	  of	  creating	  a	  more	  just	  society	  where	  groups	   have	   more	   equal	   access	   to	   resources	   can	   therefore	   be	  linked	   to	   other	   concerns	   such	   as	   security.	   For	   further	  development	   of	   transitional	   justice	   theory,	   it	   is	   vital	   that	   a	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  law	  and	  legal	  institutions	  in	  transforming	   society	   is	   endorsed	   and	   that	   further	   effort	   is	   put	  into	   understanding	   the	   links	   between	   transitional	   justice	   and	  conflict	   prevention.	   	   This	   calls	   for	   interdisciplinary	   approaches,	  but	  more	  to	  the	  point	  it	  calls	  for	  a	  less	  fixed	  understanding	  of	  the	  mechanisms	   of	   transitional	   justice	   and	   for	   recognition	   that	   law	  and	   legal	   change	   in	   a	  post-­‐conflict	   society	   are	   about	  much	  more	  than	  retrospective	  justice.	  A	   third	  goal	  of	   transitional	   justice	   is	  attending	   to	   the	  needs	  of	  victims.	   	  Assuming	   that	  we	  can	  speak	  of	   such	  needs	   in	  universal	  terms	   is	  misguided.	   	  Victims	  have	  different	  needs,	  depending	  on	  the	   kind	   of	   abuses	   they	   have	   suffered	   as	   well	   as	   their	  socioeconomic	   status,	   the	   time	   span	   between	   abuses	   and	   the	  implementation	   of	   measures	   to	   address	   their	   needs,	   the	  perceptions	   in	   different	   cultures	   of	   what	   are	   the	   most	   relevant	  ways	  of	  redressing	  harms,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  should	  define	  victims	  may	  vary	   from	  context	   to	  context.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  such	  as	  in	  a	  number	  of	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  it	  may	  make	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  the	  victims	  were	  predominantly	  those	  who	  were	  tortured,	  illegally	  detained,	  or	  the	  families	  of	  those	  who	  “disappeared.”	   	  While	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   other	   individuals	  and	  groups	  did	  not	   suffer	  under	  authoritarian	   rule,	   it	  may	  make	  sense	   for	   processes	   of	   transitional	   justice	   to	   focus	   primarily	   on	  redressing	  the	  most	  immediate	  victims	  of	  the	  past	  regime	  in	  such	  contexts.	   	   In	   other	   cases,	   however,	   those	   who	   were	   victimized	  under	  a	  past	  regime	  or	  during	  a	  conflict	  may	  far	  exceed	  those	  who	  suffered	   from	  direct	  and	  personal	  violence.	   	  Dealing	  with	  abuses	  after	   identity-­‐based	  conflict,	   for	  example,	   tends	   to	   require	   that	  a	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  1	  more	   nuanced	   understanding	   of	   victims	   is	   endorsed	   because	  whole	  groups	  may	  have	  suffered.	  	  And,	  when	  dealing	  with	  abuses	  committed	   by	   Western	   democracies	   against	   indigenous	  populations,	   it	   may	   be	   insufficient	   to	   say	   that	   victims	   are	   only	  those	  who	  were	  directly	  subjected	  to	  oppression.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	   time	   span	   between	   the	   point	   where	   these	   abuses	   were	  committed	   and	   the	   putting	   in	   place	   of	   transitional	   justice	  measures	  may	  mean	   that	   the	   direct	   victims	   are	   no	   longer	   alive,	  and	  more	  importantly	  because	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  oppression	  is	   in	  many	   cases	   still	   being	   felt	   by	   the	   current	   generation	   of	  descendants	  of	  those	  originally	  oppressed.	  It	   is	   essential	   that	   studies	   of	   transitional	   justice	   further	  investigate	   the	   most	   pressing	   needs	   of	   victims	   in	   different	  contexts	   and	   further	   discuss	   how	   these	   needs	   can	   be	   integrated	  into	  transitional	  justice	  measures.	  In	   sum,	   this	   Article	   has	   argued	   that	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	  distinguishing	   between	   the	   different	   types	   of	   situations	   where	  transitional	  justice	  is	  utilized.	  	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  different	  cases	   are	   often	   characterized	  by	   very	  different	   interests	   seeking	  transitional	   justice,	   and	   despite	   the	   observation	   that	   evaluating	  such	   objectives	   must	   take	   place	   using	   different	   normative	  frameworks	   according	   to	   the	   type	   of	   case	   in	   question,	   it	   is	   still	  possible	   to	   put	   forward	   some	   overall	   positive	   goals	   for	  transitional	   justice.	   	   Applying	   these	   goals	   to	   concrete	   cases,	  however,	   must	   be	   based	   on	   an	   understanding	   that	   transitional	  justice	  occurs	  in	  radically	  different	  contexts.	  	   	  
